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SOVIET MILITARY ART

Description, Documents on 1944 Iasi-Kishinev Operation

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pp 7-19

[Article by Col V.P. Krikunov, editor for the problems of strategy and operational art: "The Defeat of Army Group Southern Ukraine"; the article refers to the subject of the previous article "Questions of the Development of Military Art in an Operation," published in this journal, No 8, 1984, pp 9-17]

[Text] [Introduction] A little more than 45 years ago, there was one of the most outstanding offensive operations by the Soviet Army against the shock force of imperialism, German Nazism, the Iasi-Kishinev Operation. It lasted just 10 days, from 20 through 29 August 1944. [End of Introduction]

The enormous successes of the Soviet Army in the Southern Ukraine and its entry into Romanian territory in the spring of 1944 led to an abrupt change in the military political situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front. Considering these circumstances the Iasi-Kishinev Operation was planned and carried out; in the course of this operation in an unprecedentedly short period of time, Army Group Southern Ukraine, the southern wing of the Wehrmacht's Eastern Front was shattered and this led to the collapse of enemy defenses on the Balkan sector. The Nazi Command was deprived of 22 German divisions and a majority of the Romanian divisions which were part of the group. The enemy lost over 200,000 soldiers and officers taken prisoner (including 25 generals) as well as a great deal of combat equipment, weapons and military supplies.¹

The Nazi military political leadership was endeavoring at any price to hold Romania on its side as it was the main supplier of oil for Nazi Germany and in addition covered the main routes into the Balkans and Hungary. Moreover, the natural conditions of Romania and the other Baltic countries made them an important strategic staging area for organizing a protracted defense.

Political plans vis-a-vis the Balkan countries were also being hatched out in the United States which was planning to establish a "cordon sanitaire" against the USSR by maintaining pro-Fascist regimes in them. As is now known, the American representative Allan Dulles during secret separate talks at the beginning of 1943 in Switzerland with Prince M. Hohenlohe who represented German interests, stated that "...by broadening Poland to the east and maintaining Romania and a strong Hungary, it is essential to support the creation of a

"cordon sanitaire" against Bolshevism and Panslavism."² However, the crushing defeat of the Nazi troops in Romania thwarted the plans of the U.S. and English reactionary circles to land American-English troops in the Balkans before the Soviet Army reached there in order to capture advantageous positions for their far-reaching goals.

The U.S. and English plans for the Balkans were to the liking of the Romanian reactionary forces. As was pointed out by the Romanian historian M. Fetu, the government of I. Antonescu and the leaders of the bourgeois parties J. Maniu and D. Bratianu proposed going over to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition at the moment the Anglo-American troops reached the Danube. The implementation of the planned was aimed at maintaining reactionary, antipopular regimes in these countries and replacing German occupation by Anglo-American rule.

In successfully conducting the spring offensive of 1944 on the Right Bank Ukraine, the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts reached the headwaters of the Seret River, they captured the towns of Pashkani, Bravicheny, Dubossary and then the front ran along the Dniester to the Black Sea. Several bridgeheads had been captured along the right bank of the Dniester and the most significant of these was to the south of Tiraspol. As a result of this, the Second Ukrainian Front held a threatening position hanging to the north over the main forces of the enemy Army Group Southern Ukraine while the Third Ukrainian Front tied the enemy down from the east.

Considering the successes in Belorussia and the Ukraine, Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] adopted the decision to conduct the Iasi-Kishinev Operation. Its aim was to defeat Army Group Southern Ukraine, to liberate Moldavia, to help the Romanian people throw off the Nazi yoke and lead to the withdrawal of Romania from the war on the side of Nazi Germany. The overall plan of the operation envisaged: the launching of two powerful crushing strikes some 200 km apart (see the diagram) with the forces of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and Danube Naval Flotilla to split the opposing enemy grouping and, in exploiting the offensive along converging axes of Husi and Falcu, to defeat the main forces of Army Group Southern Ukraine and subsequently push into the interior of Romania (see Document 1). The Black Sea Fleet had the task of landing amphibious forces in the area of Akkerman (Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy) and on the western coast of the Black Sea, to disrupt enemy sealanes and destroy its ships, to launch massed air strikes against the bases of Constanta and Sulina and with the arrival of the Danube Flotilla (commander, Rear Adm S.G. Gorshkov) on the Danube, to assist the ground forces in crossing the river.³ The operation was to involve 1.25 million men, 16,000 guns and mortars, 1,870 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU] and 2,200 combat aircraft (considering the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet).




Diagram. Course of Iasi-Kishinev Operation, 1944

In accord with the overall plan of the operation, the fronts were to launch deep thrusts against the most vulnerable places in the enemy defenses. The main assault grouping of the Second Ukrainian Front (commander, Army Gen R.Ya. Malinovskiy) was to outflank the Iasi and Tirgu Frumos Fortified Areas and this would make it possible for it to seal off the 6th German Army from the 8th Army and skirt the difficult ranges of the Eastern Carpathians to the south. The Third Ukrainian Front (commander, Army Gen F.I. Tolbukhin) by a thrust from the Kitskan bridgehead against the boundary of the German and Romanian troops on the Husi axis was to split the forces of the 6th German Army and the 3d Romanian Army and together with the troops of the 2d Ukrainian Front destroy the 6th German Army. The left wing of the Third Ukrainian Front with the support of the Black Sea Fleet (commander, Adm F.S. Oktyabrskiy) was to encircle and destroy the 3d Romanian Army.

Headquarters demanded that the main forces of both fronts focus on defeating the Kishinev enemy grouping, correctly assuming that the successful execution of this main task would create good conditions for the rapid advance of the Soviet Army into the interior of Romania and capture its main economic and political centers. "Powerful strikes against the defenses of the Nazi ally should, as I.V. Stalin assumed, influence the policy of the royal Romanian government and contribute to its withdrawal from the war."⁴

Certain foreign historians, in referring to the Directive of Hq SHC of 2 August 1944, reduce the goal of the operation to defeating the enemy grouping in the area of Iasi-Kishinev, Bendery and reaching Focsani. Here they do not consider that this directive set the tasks for the first stage of the operation for the troops. Subsequently, these were defined by the directives of Headquarters of 21 and 29 August (see Documents 2, 4, 5) as well as by the orders of the front commanders.

By mid-August 1944, along the 580-km front from the foothills of the Carpathians to the Black Sea, the Nazi Command had concentrated a powerful Army Group Southern Ukraine. It included two army groups: Woehler (8th German, 4th Romanian Armies and XVII Separate German Corps) which covered the Focsani sector and the 2d Dumitrescu (6th German and 3d Romanian Armies) deployed on the Kishinev sector. The troops of the Army Group numbered 47 divisions and 5 brigades. They were supported by a portion of the forces from the 4th Air Fleet and a Romanian Air Corps. The enemy grouping numbered 900,000 men, 7,600 guns and mortars, 404 tanks and assault guns (not counting the reserves moved up in the course of the operation) and 810 combat aircraft.⁵

By the start of the offensive of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts, the enemy had been able to establish a strong echeloned defensive up to 80 km deep and with a developed system of fortification structures. A particularly strong defensive was established in front of the

Second Ukrainian Front; this consisted of three defensive zones based on natural impassable lines. Here the tactical defensive zone included two lines and was from 8 to 19 km deep. A third line ran along the Mare Range at a distance of 15-20 km from the forward edge.

On the sector of the Third Ukrainian Front, the enemy had built three defensive lines and on the Kishinev sector, four of them, of which the main one (depth 6-8 km) was the most prepared. In the operational zone the enemy established two defensive lines, one of which was on the western bank of the Seret River and designed to cover the Focsani Gates between the Carpathians and the Danube.

The Soviet troop offensive in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation commenced on 20 August 1944. It was preceded by powerful artillery softening up and on the Third Ukrainian Front also by air softening up. On the first day the troops of both fronts breached the enemy tactical defenses and advanced from 10 to 16 km in depth. The assault groupings of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts began to rapidly advance toward one another.

In the fighting for the enemy tactical defensive zone, the Soviet troops demonstrated not only outstanding combat skill but also unsurpassed morale and a readiness for self-sacrifice for the sake of victory over the hated enemy. Thus, the company commander from the 468th Rifle Regiment of the 111th Rifle Division in the 52d Army, Lt A.R. Shemigon and the squad commander from the 21st Rifle Regiment of the 180th Rifle Division of the 27th Army, Sgt A.Ye. Shevchenko, and others repeated the feat of Aleksandr Matrosov.

In order to halt the Soviet troop advance, the Nazi Command quickly moved up from its reserve into the Iasi area three infantry divisions and one tank division. However, the enemy counterattacks could not check the advance. The troops of the 6th Tank Army were committed to the breach and they, overcoming the stubborn enemy resistance, exploited the success and began to pursue the retreating enemy units and formations.

During the day of 20 August, the enemy lost nine divisions. The Romanian troops suffered particularly heavy losses. According to the conclusion of the commander of Army Group Southern Ukraine, Gen H. Friessner, even on the very first day the outcome of the fighting was catastrophic for the group. "In the Dumitrescu Group," wrote Friessner, both Romanian divisions of the XXIX Army Corps (4th Mountain Infantry and 21st Infantry) were completely routed. Up to five Romanian divisions were completely defeated in the Woehler Army Group.⁶ The heavy losses caused to the Romanian troops influenced their morale. Entire units began to surrender. On 21 August, the German Command issued instructions to Gen Kirchner to prevent the Romanian units making up his group from carrying out the instructions of the 4th Romanian Army to pull back to new lines.

On the second day of the operation, the troops of both Soviet fronts, in committing mobile formations to battle, defeated the enemy operational reserves which had been hurriedly thrown into battle, they completed the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and came out in the operational expanse. The Second Ukrainian Front captured an important Romanian economic center, the town of Iasi. The mobile formations pushed rapidly along convergent axes to Husi in the aim of surrounding the 6th German Army.

The Nazi Command, in order to avoid encirclement of the main forces of the army group, was forced on 21 August to issue orders to pull them back from the Kishinev salient to the west and southwest behind the Prut. But, as Friessner pointed out, it was too late!⁷ On 23 August, with the arrival of the XVIII Tank Corps in the Husi area and the VII Mechanized Corps to the crossings over the Prut in the Leusheny area and the IV Guards Mechanized Corps in Leovo, the operational encirclement of the enemy Kishinev grouping was complete.

Simultaneously, the armies on the adjacent flanks of the fronts (4th Guards and 5th Assault Armies) went over to the offensive and as a result of this on 24 August, the formations of the 5th Assault Army (commander, Lt Gen N.E. Berzarin) liberated the capital of Moldavia, Kishinev.

Military operations developed just as rapidly on the left wing of the Third Ukrainian Front, where during the night of 22 August, its 46th Army began to carry out an independent operation to surround the 3d Romanian Army and as a result of this the Romanian troops which fell into this second pocket on 24 August ceased resistance.

In the arising situation, Gen Friessner issued orders to his troops to retreat to the Carpathian positions. However, the main forces of the German Army were no longer able to do this. On 24 August, the formations of the Second Ukrainian Front eliminated the narrow corridor which had been formed the day before and securely closed the ring of encirclement around the enemy grouping. On the same day, Soviet troops liberated the towns of Bacau, Tirgu-Neamt, Husi, Tecuci, they cut the road to Focsani and rapidly began to advance into the interior of Romania. As was pointed out in the combat log of the Second Ukrainian Front for August 1944, "by the end of 23 August, our troops had broadened the breakthrough to 240 km along the front and 80 km in depth, they had defeated all the operational enemy reserves which had tried to stop our offensive and had come out in the operational expanse, having thus cut off the routes of retreat for the Kishinev grouping to the south and to the southwest. By the end of 23 August, the defeat of the Romanian troops standing against the Second Ukrainian Front was complete."⁸

The representative of Hq SHC, MSU S.K. Timoshenko, reported on this to I. Stalin (see Document 3). From the

report it can be seen that the attempts by the surrounded Kishinev enemy grouping to break out of the pocket had collapsed. The Soviet troops which were fighting on the inner perimeter occupied the important strongpoint of the town of Roman and during the night of 24 August, the town of Tilad and approached the town of Bacau.

The former Wehrmacht Gen K. Tippelskirch, in recalling the actions of the Soviet troops in the operation wrote: "Like enormous sea waves, the enemy troops rolled across and overwhelmed the German forces from all sides. Any centralized leadership over combat halted and the rear was cut off.... The German troops broken up into individual combat groups were forced to make their way to the west.... The ring of Russian troops had so narrowed around several German divisions that they had to surrender."⁹

The Nazi Command was powerless before the rapidly developing events with the collapse of its front under the blows of the Soviet troops. Our victory at Iasi and Kishinev created favorable conditions for a people's revolt in Romania against the Nazi enslavers. On 22 August, in Bucharest it became known that Army Group Southern Ukraine had suffered a catastrophic defeat. "The moment of the overthrow of the Fascist Antonescu dictatorship and the entry of Romania into the just war against Nazi Germany," said G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "was chosen by our party's Central Committee due to the presence of favorable conditions created by the rapid Soviet advance on the Iasi—Kishinev Front."¹⁰

The chaos and panic intensified in this nation's ruling upper clique. The indignation of the workers and masses of soldiers over the unjust war against the USSR reached its apogee. In the arising situation, in Romania under the leadership of the Communist Party on 23 August, a national armed insurrection broke out and this marked the beginning of the "revolution of national and social liberation."¹¹ The military fascist dictatorship was overthrown and Mar Antonescu arrested (see Document 8). As a result of the successful actions by the Soviet troops and the armed insurrection, Romania pulled out of the war against the Soviet Union and came over to the side of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Romanian Army turned its weapons against its former ally. Together with the Soviet Army, the Romanian troops began to fight to liberate their nation from the Nazis. At the same time, an exceptionally important role was played by the friendly, internationalist position of our army, vis-a-vis the Romanian, and this provided great moral support for the Romanian servicemen who experienced a difficult psychological process in line with the shift from fighting against the Soviet Army to actions in an alliance with it.

The attempts undertaken by the Nazi military political leadership to hold the Romanian satellite in the aggressive bloc, the complicated domestic political situation in Romania as well as the intrigues of the imperialist reactionary forces demanded the most decisive actions on the part of the Soviet Command to quickly liberate this country. For this reason, it took a definite risk,

having left 34 divisions to destroy the surrounded enemy grouping and employed over 50 divisions to rapidly exploit the offensive into the interior of Romanian territory. Here the crucial role was assigned to the Second Ukrainian Front. In the morning of 31 August, the 6th Tank Army and the 53d Army together with the 1st Romanian Volunteer Division imeni Tudor Vladimirescu entered Bucharest thereby reinforcing the victory of the antifascist insurrection.

The operation of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts developed with lightning speed. By the end of 27 August, the basic mass of enemy troops surrounded to the east of the Prut River was taken prisoner. Only a small portion of them was able to cross to the western bank and reach the rear lines of the 52d Army but was destroyed by the forces of the reserve formations.

On the external perimeter, the troops were pushing rapidly into the interior of Romania. The offensive was carried out on three axes: Carpathian, Focsani and Maritime. The troops of the Second Ukrainian Front with their right wing, in exploiting the offensive toward Northern Transylvania, successfully crossed the Eastern Carpathians and with the left, overcoming stubborn resistance by the enemy, broke through the Focsani defensive line and took the towns of Focsani and Besau and this opened the road to Ploiesti and Bucharest.

On the Maritime axis, the Third Ukrainian Front captured the towns of Tulcea, Galati and Braila.

Thus, on 29 August, the troops of both fronts had carried out the tasks set for them and without an operational pause began to carry out new ones. Over a period of 10 days, they had dealt a crushing defeat to Army Group Southern Ukraine (see Documents 6, 7 for the Third Ukrainian Front; there are no generalized data for the Second Ukrainian Front). This fundamentally changed the entire strategic situation in the south and crushed the Nazi defenses on the Balkan strategic sector.

Contrary to historical facts, certain foreign historians have endeavored to play down the role of the Soviet Army in the defeat of the main forces of Army Group Southern Ukraine, explaining the defeat of the Nazi troops by political factors. In a number of works, the antifascist revolt in Romania is analyzed irrespective of the events on the Soviet-German Front, and without considering the successful development of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation. There has been a major shift in accents toward overstating the role of the revolt and playing down the role of the Soviet Army in establishing favorable foreign conditions for the victory of the rebels. Thus, the West German historian, W. Wagner, in the book "Die Teilung Europas" [The Partitioning of Europe] asserts that supposedly "with a single blow, he (King Michael.—Editors) opened the gates for the Soviet troops into the Balkans."¹²

Unconditionally, the antifascist armed insurrection of the Romanian people did play an essential role in the overthrow of the Antonescu fascist dictatorship. But it is

the historical truth that its success was predetermined by the brilliant victory of the Soviet Army in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation. Incidentally, this has also been recognized by certain historians in the West. The West German historian, L. Gruchman, for example, in turning to the question of the Iasi-Kishinev Operation, has written: "The Soviet troops, as a result of the rapid offensive of the two Ukrainian Fronts, carried out a deep breach of the German defenses and captured the undestroyed bridges over the Prut and Danube Rivers, thereby opening the way to Bucharest and into Dobruja.... In the arising situation—hopeless in military terms—the Antonescu government was overthrown on 23 August."¹³

At the same time, the path of the further social development of Romania was determined by the Romanian people themselves without any interference from without. Of important significance in this regard was the Statement of the Soviet Government on events in Romania of 25 August 1944. This pointed out: "The Soviet Union has no intention of taking any part of Romanian territory or altering the existing social system in Romania or in any manner encroaching on the independence of Romania. On the contrary, the Soviet government considers it necessary together with the Romanians to restore Romanian independence by liberating Romania from the Nazi yoke."¹⁴

The decisive impact of the victory of the Soviet troops in this operation on the overthrow of the fascist regime was emphasized in the party documents of the Romanian CP: "The decisive factor which brought about the overthrow of the Antonescu regime was the breaching of the German Front in Moldavia and the rapid advance of the Red Army toward Bucharest."¹⁵

Having received news of the events in Bucharest, Hitler ordered the revolt be suppressed, the king arrested and a government established headed by a general friendly toward Germany. The Commander of Army Group Southern Ukraine, Gen Friessner, was given extraordinary powers for acting in Romania. Field Mar Keitel and Gen Dugierian in a report to Hitler proposed "the taking of every measure so that Romania disappeared from the map of Europe and the Romanian people would cease to exist as a nation."¹⁶

In the morning of 14 August, Nazi aviation subjected the Romanian capital to barbarian bombing. The new Romanian government of Gen Sanatescu declared war on Germany and issued orders for the Romanian Army to disarm the Germans. The rebels in Bucharest, Ploiesti and other places under the leadership of the Romanian CP conducted a courageous struggle against the Nazis.

Under the existing situation, a reinforcing of the revolt's success depended not solely upon the heroic struggle of the rebels but chiefly upon the speed and decisiveness of Soviet Army operations. A weakening of the thrust of the Soviet troops or a drop in the rate of their advance could be employed by the German Command for shifting

forces into Romania and suppressing the revolt. Intense fighting was going on everywhere. This can be seen from the fact that in the fight for the liberation of the Romanian people from fascism, the Soviet Army lost 286,000 persons, 69,000 of which were killed and buried on Romanian territory.¹⁷ "We express," said Nicolae Ceausescu, "our gratitude toward the glorious Army of the Soviet Union which at a price of enormous sacrifices crushed the Nazi military machine and made a decisive contribution to the liberation of Romania and other countries from the fascist yoke and to the defeat of Nazi Germany."¹⁸

On 29 August, the Soviet troops were approaching Ploiesti and Bucharest. By this time units of the Third Ukrainian Front had entered the towns of Tulcea, Galati, Braila, Sulina and Constanta. Fighting along with the V Guards Tank Corps of the 6th Tank Army and the 3d Guards Airborne Division for the liberation of Ploiesti were Romanian rebels as well as subunits of the 18th Romanian Infantry Division which had retreated from the front.

With the capture of Ploiesti, Nazi aviation was deprived of oil, a threat to Bucharest from the north was eliminated and the Soviet and Romanian troops were able to enter Transylvania.

On 31 August, Soviet troops entered Bucharest which had been liberated by the Romanian rebels. Entering along with them were units of the 1st Romanian Volunteer Division imeni Tudor Vladimirescu which had been established on Soviet territory. The population of the capital joyously welcomed the liberators.

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation ended with a brilliant victory for the Soviet troops. In the course of it in just 10 days the almost million-strong enemy grouping, Army Group Southern Ukraine, had been defeated. As was pointed out in the group's combat log, this represented "the greatest catastrophe which the army group had ever experienced."¹⁹ The Soviet troops had destroyed 22 German divisions and also routed virtually all the Romanian formations on the front. Some 208,600 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, 490 tanks and assault guns were destroyed along with 1,500 guns, 298 aircraft and 15,000 motor vehicles. The Soviet troops captured over 2,000 guns, 340 tanks and assault guns, around 18,000 motor vehicles, 40 aircraft and a great deal of combat equipment and weapons²⁰ (the losses in the quoted documents are significantly greater.—V.K.).

Subsequently, the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in accord with the Headquarters Directive of 29 August 1944 initiated an energetic offensive in the central part of Romania and on the approaches to Bulgaria. As a result of this, Soviet troops breached the enemy strategic front on an enormous sector of 500 km and advanced up to 750 km in depth. The Nazi grouping in Northern Transylvania and the Ciscarpathian Ukraine was enveloped to the southwest, a threat was created to the enemy lines of communications in Yugoslavia, Greece and

Albania, and the entire strategic situation of Nazi Germany in the Balkans deteriorated sharply. The successes of the Soviet Army were an enormous military and moral support for the peoples of the Balkans in their fight against the Nazi invaders.

The Nazi Command, having lost the main forces of the army group, was able to restore the strategic front only in mid-September, when the Hungarian Horthy troops and German formations removed from the Balkan Front which, in essence, had merged with the Eastern Front were called in for this purpose.

In withdrawing from the war on the side of Nazi Germany, Romania joined the anti-Hitler coalition. Its armed forces, fighting together with the Soviet troops, participated in the liberation of a number of the South-east European countries. The joint fight against Naziism in the concluding stage of World War II marked the beginning to relations of friendship and collaboration between our peoples and armies.

The victory of the Soviet troops in the Iasi-Kishinev Operation was of enormous significance as well for the liberation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the other Balkan countries. "For us, the Bulgarians, for the fate of Bulgaria," said Todor Zhivkov, "a particularly important role was played by the Iasi-Kishinev Operation as a result of which the southern fascist front was completely destroyed...."²¹

Direct aid to our allied Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also became possible. The threat hanging over the lines of communications of the German Baltic grouping subsequently forced the Nazis to begin pulling their troops out of Greece and Albania. An important step was taken toward the final defeat of Nazi Germany.

"The decisive aid of the Soviet Union," pointed out Todor Zhivkov, "was a distinguishing feature of not only our September Socialist Revolution, but all the people's democratic revolutions in the European countries. Not one of these countries would have been capable of liberating itself without the victories of the Red Army and without its direct aid. This objective historical fact in no way plays down the importance of their antifascist struggle and does not lead to its underestimation. Also contrary to the historical truth are certain trends to represent the people's democratic revolutions as a whole and each of them individually either as not caused by objective internal processes (and here we again encounter the reactionary theory of the 'exporting of revolution') or as a result of the actions of solely internal forces."²²

The Iasi-Kishinev Operation was a brilliant example of Soviet military art and an indicator of the high skill of the Soviet Army. Together with the other operations of the Great Patriotic War, it contributed to the victory of the Soviet people over Naziism. "In defending the freedom and independence of the motherland," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev, "the Soviet people also carried out the great

international task of saving world civilization from fascism. As a result of its defeat, the positions of progressive, democratic forces were strengthened and this led to the victory of a new social system in a number of European and Asian countries."²³

Footnotes

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2. "Falsifikatory istorii (istoricheskaya spravka)" [The Falsifiers of History (Historical Reference)], Moscow, OGIZ Gospolitizdat, 1948, p 73.
3. "Yassko-Kishinevskiy Kanny" [Iasi-Kishinev Canals], Moscow, Nauka, 1964, p 60.
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5. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 9, 1978, pp 98, 104.
6. Hans Friessner, "Proigrannyye srazheniya" [Lost Engagements], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1966, p 75.
7. Ibid., p 86.
8. TsAMO SSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 240, inv. 2779, file 1175, sheet 116.
9. K. Tippelskirch, "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [History of World War II], Moscow, Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1958, pp 463-464.
10. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, "Stati i rechi" [Articles and Speeches], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol 1, 1956, p 222.
11. N. Ceausescu, "Doklad na XII syezde Rumynskoy kommunisticheskoy partii" [Report at the 12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party], Bucharest, Meridiane, 1980, p 6.
12. W. Wagner, "Die Teilung Europas," Stuttgart, 1959, p 102.
13. L. Gruchman, "Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Deutsche Geschichte seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg," Stuttgart, Vol 11, 1953, p 207.
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15. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, op. cit., p 347.
16. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 9, p 111.
17. Ibid., p 118.
18. N. Ceausescu, "Rumyniya na puti postroyeniya vsestoronne razvito go sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva"

[Romania on the Path of Building a Completely Developed Socialist Society], Bucharest, Meridiane, Vol 5, 1971, p 866.

19. "Yassko-Kishinevskiy Kanny," p 183.
20. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy....," Vol 9, pp 108-109.
21. Todor Zhivkov, "Izbrannyye stati i rechi, 1955-1975" [Selected Articles and Speeches, 1955-1975], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p 569.
22. Todor Zhivkov, "A Historic Victory of Major Significance," KOMMUNIST, No 7, 1985, p 102.
23. PRAVDA, 9 May 1985.

Document 1*

FROM THE DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE SECOND AND THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONTS FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING THE IASI-KISHINEV OPERATION

To prepare and conduct an operation in the aim of employing the forces of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts to defeat the enemy grouping in the area of Iasi, Kishinev, Bendery and capture the line of Bacau, Leovo, Tarutino, Moldavka, with the aim of subsequently advancing to Focsani, Galati and Izmail.

For carrying out the designated task, Hq SHC orders:

1. The Second Ukrainian Front is to breach the enemy defenses, in launching a thrust with the forces of the 27th, 52d and 53d Armies, the 6th Tank Army on the general axis of Iasi, Vaslui, Falcu. In the first stage of the operation, the troops are to capture Bacau, Vaslui, Husi, to seize the crossings over the Prut River on the sector Husi, Falcu and together with the troops of the Third Ukrainian Front, rout the Kishinev enemy grouping, preventing it from retreating to Birlad, Focsani. After the defeat of the Kishinev enemy grouping, the offensive is to be continued on the general axis of Focsani, supporting the right flank of the assault grouping from the side of the Carpathians to the south of Piatra. The V Guards Cavalry Corps is to be employed for crossing the Seret River and supporting the front's right flank to the west.
2. The Third Ukrainian Front is to breach the enemy defenses to the south of Bendery and with the forces of the 57th and 37th Armies and the right wing of the 46th Army launch a thrust on the axis of Opach, Selemet, Husi, in securely supporting the front's assault grouping from the south.

In the first stage of the operation, in cooperation with the Second Ukrainian Front, the Kishinev enemy grouping is to be destroyed and the line of Leovo, Tarutino, Moldavka taken. Subsequently, the offensive is to be continued on the general axis of Reni and Izmail, preventing the enemy from pulling back behind the Prut and Danube Rivers.

3. The mobile formations (tank army, tank and mechanized corps) are to be employed after the breaching of the enemy defenses for the rapid capture of crossings on the Prut River in the area of Husi, Falcu.

4. The commander of the Second Ukrainian Front by 2400 hours on 5 August 1944 is to turn over to the commander of the Third Ukrainian Front and the latter is to occupy the sector held by the 53d Army with two rifle divisions and the corps headquarters of this army, having relieved the remaining formations of the 53d Army by the designated time.

As of the same time, the following demarcation line is to be established between the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts: Rybnitsa, Ignatsey, Chokolteni, Bravicheni, Bykovets, Kotumori and further along the Prut River. All the points are inclusive for the Third Ukrainian Front.

The commander of the Second Ukrainian Front is to employ the released troops of the 53d Army for building up the strength of the thrust on the breakthrough sectors.

5. Readiness for the offensive according to personal instructions.

Hq SHC

I. Stalin, Antonov

2300 hours, 2 August 1944

Document 2

FROM THE DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE SECOND AND THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONTS TO COMPLETE THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE ENEMY IN THE HUSI AREA AND DESTROY IT

1. Hq SHC points out that at present the main task for the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts is by the joint efforts of the two fronts to more quickly close the ring of encirclement around the enemy in the Husi area, after which this ring is to be constricted in the aim of destroying or taking prisoner the Kishinev enemy grouping.

Headquarters demands that the main forces of both fronts be used for carrying out the main task, without diverting forces to carry out other tasks.

The successful carrying out of the task of defeating the Kishinev enemy grouping will open up the way for us to the main economic and political centers of Romania.

There are about 44 enemy divisions fighting ahead of both your fronts and of this number 6 divisions have already been defeated. You have 87 divisions and, in addition, you have significant superiority over the enemy in artillery, tanks and aviation.

Thus, you have every opportunity for successfully carrying out the designated task and you should carry out this task.

Hq SHC

I. Stalin, Antonov

1740 hours, 21 August 1944

Document 3

FROM THE REPORT OF REPRESENTATIVE OF Hq SHC MSU S.K. TIMOSHENKO ON THE COURSE OF ELIMINATING THE SURROUNDED ENEMY GROUPING

1. On 25 August 1944, troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts repulsed a counterstrike by the surrounded enemy grouping on the Leovo axis and completed its elimination. Just on the Second Ukrainian Front today, up to 30,000 prisoners were taken, including around 3,500 Germans. Some 6 Romanian generals surrendered, including the commanders of the 1st and 14th Romanian Rifle Divisions together with their staffs. The Romanians are surrendering in bunches. The Germans continue to put up resistance. On 25 August, up to 20,000 prisoners had been taken on the Third Ukrainian Front.

2. Over 25 August 1944, the Second Ukrainian Front reached the line: Achapia (10 km to the southwest of Trigu-Neamt), Piatra, Bukhus, Denoseni, Khutsu, Portolom, Shuletya, Rencheniy, Pogeneshtiy, Leusheny, Lotushna, Manupleshty.

The XXIII Tank Corps captured Adzhud—Nou; the 6th Tank Army Tecuci, Puceni; the XVIII Tank Corps with one brigade crossed the Prut River at Leovo and linked up with units of the Third Ukrainian Front with the remaining brigades on the west bank of the Prut River to the north of Leovo.

3. The Third Ukrainian Front has been fighting stubbornly against the surrounded grouping on the line of Loganesty, Kotovskoye, Molesht, Chigirlen, Gradishtya, Gura-Galbena, Sarata-Galbena, Ivanovka, Gorzheshty, Karpenyany, Balgan and has reached the Prut River on a front of Serato-Rozesh, Leovo, Nikolayevka, Pleshcheni, Yepureni, Baymakliya, Kagul and is fighting for Bolgrad. Naval brigades have occupied Izmail, Reni, Kiliya.

4. On 28 August 1944, the troops of both fronts are continuing to eliminate the surrounded grouping and are continuing to advance to the Focsani line.

S. Timoshenko

2335 hours, 25 August 1944

Document 4

FROM THE DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC TO THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND UKRAINIAN FRONT FOR CONTINUING THE OFFENSIVE

Hq SHC orders:

1. The forces of the 27th, 53d and 6th Tank Armies and the XVIII Tank Corps are to continue the offensive on the general axis of Ploiesti, Olatina, Turnu-Severin. The immediate task is to capture the oil region of Ploiesti, to

pass through the Bucharest area, having cleared it of the remnants of German troops and by 5-8 September, reach the line of Cimpulung, Pitesti, Alexandria, Giurgiu. Subsequently, in continuing the offensive, to reach the Danube River on the sector from Turnu-Severin to one's left demarcation line.

2. The right wing of the front with the 40th Army, the 7th Guards Army and Gorshkov's Horse-Mechanized Group is to capture the passes across the Eastern Carpathians and by 15 September, reach a line of Bistrica, Cluj, Acud, Sibiu. Subsequently, in providing a cover to the west, with the main forces of the front's right wing, to launch a thrust on the general axis of Satyu-Mare in the aim of assisting the troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in crossing the Carpathians and reaching the area of Uzhgorod, Mukachevo.

3. As of 0600 hours on 29 August, to set the following demarcation line between the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts: as far as Tudor Vladimirescu as before and then Feurei Station, Horia, Vidra, Giurgiu. All points are inclusive for the Third Ukrainian Front.

Hq SHC

I. Stalin, Antonov

2150 hours, 29 August 1944

Document 5

FROM THE DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC TO THE COMMANDER OF THE THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONT TO CONTINUE THE OFFENSIVE

The main task for the Third Ukrainian Front is in continuing the offensive along the entire front, to occupy Northern Dobrudzhu and reach the new Romanian-Bulgarian frontier.

For carrying out this task, Hq SHC orders:

1. The main forces are to cross the Danube River on the sector Galati, Izmail and, in continuing the offensive along the right bank of the Danube River, by 2-3 September, to capture Constanta, Cernavoda and on 5-6 September, reach the new Romanian-Bulgarian frontier on the sector Ostrov, Cranova, Guvenlia, Hajilar.

2. With the right wing of the front, an offensive is to be commenced along the left bank of the Danube River with the task of capturing the Calarasi area and on 4-5 September, to reach the Romanian-Bulgarian frontier along the Danube River as far as your right demarcation line.

3. As of 0600 hours on 29 August, to establish the following demarcation line between the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts: to Tudor-Vladimirescu, as before, and then Feurei Station, Horia, Vidra, Giurgiu. All points are for the Third Ukrainian Front inclusively.

Hq SHC

I. Stalin, Antonov

0150 hours, 29 August 1944

Document 6

TO COMRADE SEMENOV [PSEUDONYM OF
STALIN]
COPY TO COMRADE TIKHONOV [PSEUDONYM
OF TIMOCHENKO]

BATTLE REPORT NO. 01241. STAFF OF THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONT, 1830 HOURS, 28 AUGUST 1944

1. By the start of the operation on 20 August 1944, ahead of the Third Ukrainian Front were: the 6th German Army under the command of Gen Art Piko Vretter and the III Army Corps of the 3d Romanian Army.

The 6th Army included: the XLIV Army Corps (the 62d, it is group F, the 258th, 282d and 335th Infantry Divisions); the LII Army Corps (the 161st, it is group A, 294th, 320th and 384th Infantry Divisions); the XXX Army Corps (302d, 257th, 15th and 306th Infantry Divisions); the XXIX Army Corps (9th, 153d Infantry Divisions (German), 4th Mountain and 21st Infantry Divisions).

Army Reserve: 13th Panzer Division.

The III Army Corps (Romanian) included: the 2d, 15th, 110th and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division (Romanian).

Operating ahead of the entire front were: 4 German army corps, 1 Romanian army corps, 14 German infantry divisions, 6 Romanian infantry divisions, and 1 Romanian cavalry division. A total of 23 formations.

In addition, there are 68 different separate special units, including: 2 separate regiments, 9 artillery regiments of the RGK [High Command Reserve], 8 separate RGK artillery battalions, 5 separate antitank battalions of the RGK, 5 assault gun brigades, 3 antiaircraft battalions of the RGK, 3 RGK combat engineer regiments, 12 construction battalions, 1 signals regiment, 4 penalty battalions and others.

The total number of enemy troops and equipment for the main types of weapons were: 295,000 men (including 75,000 Romanians), 3,064 field guns of different caliber, 405 assault guns, 90 tanks, 10,880 machine guns and 1,840 mortars.

2. The troops of the front with a main thrust against two German and two Romanian divisions on the sector to the south of Bendery, Tolmaz, Chobruchu, with the forces of the 57th, 37th and 46th Armies on 20 August 1944 breached the enemy defenses; in committing the IV Guards Mechanized Corps and the VII Mechanized Corps to the breach from the morning of the second day of the offensive, the Bessarabia enemy grouping was split into the Kishinev and Akkerman.

By the end of the fourth day of the operation, the troops of the front had completed the encirclement of the

Kishinev troop group and the Akkerman group by landing an amphibious force in the Akkerman area.

In the course of the following 3 days of heavy fighting to destroy and capture the surrounded enemy groupings, the troop successfully repulsed numerous and fierce assaults by the enemy which was attempting to break through. In gradually tightening the ring of encirclement, on 27 August 1944 the remnants of the surrounded Kishinev grouping were finally defeated and taken prisoner.

The troops of the 46th Army, having completed the elimination of the Akkerman enemy grouping on 25 August 1944, began a rapid offensive, they crossed the Prut River and the state frontier, they entered Romanian territory, reaching by the end of the day of 27 August 1944 the Seret River on the front of Independenta, Vargosi, Galati, they crossed the Danube River and captured Isaccea, Tulcea.

As a result of the operation, the liberation of the Moldavian SSR and Izmail Oblast was fully completed; here 12 towns were liberated including the capital of Moldavia, Kishinev as well as the oblast centers of the Ukraine, Izmail and Akkerman, and 970 population points. In addition, Galati, Tulcea and Brailov were captured on Romanian territory.

The total area of the liberated and captured territory equals 40,112 km².

3. During the period of the front's operation, the following enemy formations were destroyed and defeated:

a) In breaching the enemy defensive line: the 15th and 306th Infantry Divisions (German), the 4th Mountain Rifle Division and 21st Infantry Division (Romanian) were completely destroyed and the 13th Panzer Division (German) was defeated with the remnants retreating into Romania;

b) In surrounding the Akkerman enemy grouping, the 9th Infantry Division (German) was completely destroyed while the 2d, 15th and 110th Infantry Divisions (Romanian) were defeated and largely captured while the 153d Infantry Division (German), the 24th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Romanian) suffered heavy losses;

c) In surrounding the Kishinev enemy grouping, completely destroyed and captured were the following: 282d, 335th, 161st (it is group A), 294th, 320th, 384th, 302d, 257th and 15th Infantry Divisions (German) and the headquarters of the XLIV, LII, XXX and XXIX Army Corps (German);

d) In the Kishinev and Akkerman surrounded enemy groupings, 68 separate special units and subunits operating ahead of the front were completely defeated and captured.

The total figures for losses were: 147,000 soldiers and officers, 1,100 field guns of various calibers, 250 assault

guns and tanks, 2,300 machine guns, 540 mortars, 10,192 motor vehicles and 14,000 rifles.

Captured and located now on the territory of the front are: up to 1,800 field guns of varying caliber, 170 assault guns and tanks, 5,400 machine guns, 700 mortars, 68,000 rifles, 9,889 motor vehicles, 9,201 carts, 375 various dumps, 12 river barges, 4 towed rafts, 8 launches, up to 700 railroad cars, 91 steam locomotives and up to 20,000 horses.

Up to 92,000 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, including over 55,000 Germans.

Prisoner evidence has established that the commanders of the four German army corps who are in the surrounded grouping have changed into civilian clothing and have concealed themselves among the public.

Thus, the total enemy losses in personnel and for the main types of combat equipment are: up to 240,000 men, 2,900 field guns of varying caliber, 420 tanks and assault guns, 7,700 machine guns, 1,240 mortars, 20,080 motor vehicles and tractors and 82,000 rifles.

4. In the course of the operation the troops of the front suffered the following losses in personnel and equipment: 4,114 persons killed, 16,262 men wounded and 557 persons missing in action. Total losses are 20,933 men.

The irrecoverable losses for the main types of combat equipment are: 82 tanks and SAU, 27 field guns of varying caliber and 59 aircraft.

5. In conducting the operation the following ammunition was consumed (front units of fire): 1.1 for the 203-mm BM; 1.5 for the 152-mm; 1.5 for the 122-mm, 1.2 for the 76-mm DA; 1.0 for 76-mm PA; 1.2 for 120-mm mortars; 1.1 for 82-mm mortars; 0.3 for rifle cartridges; 0.4 for TT cartridges.

6. In conducting the operation, in addition to the great enthusiasm of the troops and the availability of equipment, the reported success was aided by the covert concentration of the troops on the axis of the main thrust and the disinformation of the enemy on the secondary sector (at the center of the 5th Assault Army), as a consequence of which the enemy considered the Kishinev sector as the possible sector for the main thrust from our side and this it was expecting and as a result was late in promptly pulling back its forces.

These data are confirmed by the evidence of a whole series of captured generals.

Tolbukhin

Zheltoz

Biryuzov

Document 7

**FROM THE DESCRIPTION OF THE COMBAT OF
THE THIRD UKRAINIAN FRONT IN THE
COURSE OF THE IASI-KISHINEV OPERATION
(OPERATION RESULTS)**

The Kishinev Operation demonstrated an example unprecedented in the history of the troops: in 8 days of offensive fighting, the German 6th Army was completely destroyed. This army had forces which were little inferior to the forces of the Third Ukrainian Front and for a period of 4 months it had organized and reinforced its defenses. But still as a result of the well-conceived idea of the operation, its careful preparation and brilliant execution, the complete defeat of the enemy was achieved, although overall superiority of the forces was virtually absent.

In addition, the enemy was defeated with very insignificant losses for us for such a major operation. An example would be the 37th Army fighting on the axis of the main thrust and the losses of which were many-fold less than the losses caused by it to the enemy. Below is given the ratio of irretrievable losses, if one accepts the losses of the 37th Army as one: for personnel 1:70; for weapons 1:19; for mortars 1:16; for machine guns 1:77; for submachine guns 1:3; for rifles 1:24; for tanks and SAU 1:6; for motor vehicles 1:986; for horses 1:87; for carts 1:302; for radios 1:25.

In this operation the enemy suffered unprecedentedly heavy losses. In terms of personnel and the main types of combat equipment, these losses over the 8 days of the operation—from 20 through 27 August 1944—were: (for the list of losses, see Document 6, Point 3.—Editors).

The German 6th Army which was on the defensive in Bessarabia has ceased to exist. The troops of the front have opened up broad operational scope.

The Kishinev Operation sharply altered the entire military and political situation in the south. In addition to a complete clearing of Bessarabia and the reaching of the state frontier by our troops, Romania has been occupied by the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts. This major German satellite from whence the Germans secured the largest number of troops, various types of raw materials and, most importantly, up to 40 percent of all their deliveries of natural oil product, has been taken out of the Hitler bloc. In addition, for facilitating its lot, Romania has declared war on Germany and Hungary and has entered actively on the side of the USSR and Allies.

The reaching of the Bulgarian-Romanian frontier by the Third Ukrainian Front, has led to a political coup in Bulgaria. The Germans, without waiting for the arrival of our troops in Bulgaria, hurriedly began to clear out of Bulgaria. A significant number of German soldiers and officers was interned by the Bulgarians themselves and turned over to us as prisoners of war. Bulgaria broke off

its alliance with Germany, declared war on it and now is fighting actively on the side of the united nations.

The entry of Bulgaria into the war on our side and the reaching of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav frontier by our troops have forced the Germans to hurriedly abandon Greece, Yugoslav Macedonia and a larger portion of Serbia.

With the arrival of our troops in Romania and Bulgaria, the situation on the Black Sea changed fundamentally. While prior to this the Germans, in relying on the naval bases in Constanta, Varna and Burgas, were able to monitor our shipping on the Black Sea and created conditions where we were virtually unable to use the Black Sea, at present the Black Sea is completely in our hands and our normal navigation is quickly being rebuilt.

The Romanian and Bulgarian economy have been put into serving the cause of fighting against Germany. The Ploiesti oil is now being consumed not in German tanks and vehicles but in ours. A major waterway in the south—the Danube River—over a large extent is now in our service.

The situation in Yugoslavia has also changed fundamentally. Our troops have been able to provide direct aid to the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, to launch a strike at Belgrad and liberate the Yugoslav capital and subsequently utilize Yugoslav territory as a staging area for launching a strike at Hungary from the southeast.

These are the results of the Kishinev Operation of the Third Ukrainian Front. All the enormous significance of this operation is particularly striking if one considers that all these results were achieved in an unprecedentedly short operational time of 8 days, from 20 through 27 August 1944, and with unprecedentedly small losses for such a major operation.

Tolbukhin

Zhelto

Biryuzov

Document 8

MOSCOW, TO COMRADE STALIN

2 September 1944

I report that on 31 August 1944, Lt Gen Susaykov and Tevchenkov arrived in Bucharest and they had been instructed by the front's military council to establish where Mar Antonescu was and in the event of discovering him, place him under guard.

Upon instructions of the front military council member, Lt Gen Susaykov, the Chief of the front's Political Directorate, Lt Gen Tevchenkov, called on the Romanian City Commandant, Corps Gen Tudorescu, and through him called in for talks the Minister of Internal Affairs Petrescu and the Mayor of the city, Gen Dombrovski.

After some confusion and hesitation, they stated that Antonescu had been arrested, his location was unknown to them but there was one person who did know this.

After a second categorical warning from Lt Gen Tevchenkov that the Soviet military command wanted to know and see where Mar Antonescu was being held and under what conditions, the City Commandant, Corps Gen Tudorescu, phoned the government about this. Some time later, there arrived a man in civilian clothing representing himself as a member of the Romanian CP Central Committee, Yemelian Bodnaras, and who had a good knowledge of Russian. To the question of where Mar Antonescu was, he replied that the marshal was under the guard of the communists at a secret apartment.

Then Lt Gen Tevchenkov, together with Bodnaras, the Romanian Gen Dombrovski, the Soviet Commandant of the City, Maj Gen Burenin, and a group of Soviet officers and soldiers as a guard totaling some 40 men left for the whereabouts of the arrested Antonescu.

In a small, 2-story house on the outskirts of Bucharest, Mar Antonescu was being kept on the upper story while on the lower floor were Mihai Antonescu, Corps Gen Vasiliu, Corps Gen Pantasi and Col Eleftrescu.

The interior guard of the arrested persons consisted of 10 civilians armed with revolvers. There was no outside guard.

Lt Gen Tevchenkov stated to Bodnaras that in line with the poor guard, the Soviet Command would assume the guarding of the arrested persons and would take them to Soviet troop positions. To this Bodnaras replied that it would be better if the arrested persons remained here and the guard reinforced with Soviet soldiers.

After this proposal was rejected, Bodnaras asked that their guard be taken along, too. This request was granted and three men of the Romanian communists accompanied the arrested persons to the new location. Bodnaras also stated that the government did not want Antonescu to end up in Moscow.

At 1700 hours on 31 August, the group of arrested persons was transported to the command post of the 53d Army, where they spent the night under our guard and in the morning of 1 September, they were brought to the front's command post.

R. Malinovskiy

I. Susaykov

Footnote

* The originals of the documents, copies of which are published here for the first time, are kept at the USSR TsAMO.

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HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

Origins of Cold War Policy in World War II Examined

904P0004B VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 10, Oct 89 (signed to press 6 Oct 89)
pp 20-26

[Article by Col V.A. Sekistov, honored scientist of the RSFSR, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "Who Intensified the Military Danger"; conclusion of the article; for first installment, see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1989, p 50]

[Text]

2. Broadening of American-English Cold War Actions (April 1945—March 1946)

The American historian F. Halliday names four periods in the development of the Cold War: 1946-1953 for the apogee of the first Cold War; 1953-1969 a tremulous antagonism (the development of the process of thaw); 1969-1979—political detente (the signing of a number of American-Soviet documents); from 1979—the second Cold War (the declaration of the Soviet Union as an "Evil Empire").¹

The West German historian B. Greiner writes about the earlier phase of the Cold War: "1944 ended when the cornerstone of new military plans had been laid."²

In Soviet publications, the start of the Cold War is linked to the speech by W. Churchill in Fulton [Missouri] on 5 March 1946. The turn to detente is given differently: at the beginning of the 1970s and in the mid-1970s. It must be admitted that the periodization of Halliday and Greiner more accurately reflects the sources, rises and falls of the Cold War.

In formulating the periodization in a most complete form, it is essential to add: the birth of the Cold War in the crucible of a hot war (the second half of 1943—April 1945), the broadening of Cold War actions (April 1945—March 1946), and a new period of a lessening of tension with the conclusion in December 1986 of the Treaty to Eliminate Medium- and Lesser-Range Missiles and the turn from the principle of overarmament to a principle of reasonable sufficiency.

The Soviet encyclopedias focus attention on the fact that Churchill at Fulton was aiming at creating an American-English alliance to fight against world communism. In the arsenal of the Cold War methods and forms we should note first of all the formation of a system of military political alliances (NATO and others), the broad network of bases around the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the accelerating of the arms race, the use of force to achieve political goals (the policy of "from a position of strength") and the employment of ideological subversion ("psychological warfare").³

American-English unity along this path gained new impetus after the sudden death of F. Roosevelt on 12 April 1945. In the United States there was an immediate strengthening of the forces in favor of intensifying the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Just 24 hours after assuming the post of president (on 13 April), Truman told the secretary of state: "We must halt the Russians."⁴ In the further speeches of the president, threatening comments became evermore obvious that the time had come to show the Russians a "armored fist" and that he intended to conduct a "hard course" vis-a-vis the USSR and for this reason would assume a "firm position."

On 23 April, Truman at a meeting in the White House proposed to immediately break off Soviet-American relations. The military leaders "had a hard time reasoning with their new commander-in-chief. They referred to the fact that Allied relations with the USSR would be halted after the surrender of Tokyo."⁵ Two days later, the Secretary of War H. Stimson and Gen Leslie Groves (the leader of the Manhattan Project) informed the new president on the course of developing the atomic bomb. Truman responded with an exclamation: "I will not have something to hit the Russians with."⁶ After the war, Groves did not conceal that this project had been carried out on an anti-Soviet basis. He even declared outright that the atomic bomb was designed "precisely against the Soviet Union." "This was the basis on which the Cold War was formed," wrote B. Greiner.⁷

The first practical step was undertaken on 12 May 1945: Truman issued orders to halt the Lend Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union.⁸

Class Goals in the Policy of the U.S. Ruling Circles Involved With Particular Force the Military Leaders in the Sphere of Political Problems.

As soon as the war in Europe was over, they no longer considered it necessary to conceal their plans vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. For example, on 18 May 1945, the former Commander of the 3d American Army Patton wrote in his diary that "the American Army, such as it is, can defeat the Russians without any particular difficulty." The fighting general who had not experienced the war at its full force backed up his prognosis by the fact that the American 'Army' was untouched....⁹ In statements by the Commander of the American Air Force Arnold dating to July 1945, it was said directly that "our next enemy is Russia" and it was essential to prepare promptly for a future war against the Soviet Union.¹⁰

The anti-Soviet statements of the political and military leaders confirmed that by the war's end in the United States, the opponents of the political course of President Roosevelt had gained the upper hand. Until the end of his life, Roosevelt and his supporters considered it possible to continue mutually advantageous relations with the USSR after the war's end.

Roosevelt had said that although "the United States and the Soviet Union are divided by an ideological abyss,

they are linked by a bridge of state interests." These were words not calculated for a mere propaganda effect. This, in particular, can be seen from his assessment contained in the last secret letter from President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister Churchill and in which Roosevelt writes about his firm intention in the future to minimize, as far as this was possible, the problems of relations with the USSR, since these problems obviously will arise every day and a majority of them will be settled by compromise."¹¹ But even in the spring of 1945 in Washington moving to the forefront in foreign policy was the ultrarightist wing of the ruling elite in America and which D. Eisenhower was later to call the military-industrial complex. The warmongers under no circumstances wanted Roosevelt's ideas to continue to determine policy after the victory over Germany.

The pressure of the fervid anti-Soviets on the political course of Washington, as the end of World War II drew closer, was also intensified by English like-thinkers.

In 1945, the English Ruling Circles Broadened Practical Measures Aimed Against the USSR Which Had Suffered Most in World War II and Had Done the Most for Victory Over the Common Enemy.

On 4 May 1945, A. Eden who was in San Francisco received a telegram from Churchill and this contained instructions to come to terms with the Americans for quickly showing our hand vis-a-vis the Russians. What did Churchill specifically have in mind? This became known some 13 years later. At the end of 1958, the well-known English correspondent, G. Bilenken, published the contents of his talk with Truman's special representative Joseph Davis who on 26 May 1945 had a confidential talk with Churchill. In the course of this talk, Churchill showed the need to begin a war against the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, since, in his opinion, the Russians had almost bled to death.

The validity of the information of George Bilenken was confirmed by the memoirs of Churchill himself. Even in 1944, he had felt that "it is essential to immediately establish a new front against it (Soviet Russia.—V.S.)."¹²

The Montgomery memoirs also contain the regret that it was impossible to commence a war against the Soviet Union in 1945. He did not conceal that he was planning a military clash with the Soviet Army and for this reason during the first half of 1945, took measures "to reach the Baltic as quickly as possible and establish a flank facing the east."¹³ The reasons which prevented the starting of a war against the Soviet Union in 1945 were, Montgomery wrote, that any English government which wanted to fight the Russians in 1945 would have encountered great unpleasantnesses within the country.

The unpleasantnesses for the English ruling circles were linked to the fact that the English people could not have been persuaded to fight the Russians in 1945. They were decisively against such a war. However, there was also

another reason which Montgomery preferred to overlook. The Chief of the British General Staff and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Alan Brooke, during those very days was writing in his diary: "...I have carefully studied the report of the planners on the possibility of starting a war against Russia.... We were instructed to carry out this study. The chances of success equal zero. There is no doubt that from now on Russia is omnipotent in Europe."

The arising insurmountable factors brought Montgomery around and forced him to insist in front of Churchill on an immediate pullback of the Western Allied troops from the zone to the east of Berlin to within their zones set by the Yalta Agreement. For an extended time, Churchill did not agree to the troop pullback.

Admiral Donitz, who replaced Hitler after the latter's suicide, on 1 May 1945 sent a memorandum to the Western Allies which stated that the United States and England were to blame for the war which was still going on and it would continue only as long as they prevented Donitz "from fighting against Bolshevism."¹⁴ This was a trial balloon for a proposal to continue the war against the Soviet Union with German forces and with the support of the Anglo-Saxons. There was no direct reply to this testing of the winds.

The war was still going on, but Churchill had already initiated practical measures to realize the plan of commencing a war against the USSR. He informed his close friends of these plans in November 1954 in celebrating his 80th anniversary. "Even before the end of the war," said Churchill, "when the Germans were surrendering in hundreds of thousands, I sent Montgomery a telegram ordering him to carefully collect the German weapons and military equipment and stockpile this so that it would be easy to reissue these weapons to the German units with which we would have to collaborate if the Soviet offensive continued."¹⁵

Churchill's admission caused a stormy response in the public. The original was not found. However, Montgomery confirmed: "I did receive such a telegram."¹⁶ A professor at the University of California, A. Smith, in the book "Churchill's German Army" on the basis of materials from the state archives, the dossiers of the secret services and documents from private archives set out the sensational results of his research. He was able to uncover a cablegram with an analogous content which Churchill had sent to the English military leaders. But Smith made another, more important discovery: right until 1946, 3 million German soldiers under the command of their former generals and partially outfitted with light weapons were in the English Occupation Zone in their former organizational formations.

Montgomery had guaranteed the Wehrmacht units an honorable "surrender on the battlefield." Thus, on 5 May, the staff of the 21st Army Group instead of unconditional surrender concluded an agreement with the German troop commander, Gen Field Mar Busch, on

maintaining the system of the German Command in Schleswig-Holstein. On 11 May, Busch was allowed to even speak on the radio. "Officers from the Allied troops were photographed in friendly poses with high-ranking German officers...."¹⁷ "English inspectors," writes A. Smith, "supervised these units and kept them ready for a campaign against their former Soviet ally."¹⁸ Even in November 1945, in the British Occupation Zone there were 5 German military corps, 25 district and local commandant offices, an air district with the wartime establishment of an air army and a number of Wehrmacht rear subunits. "All of this was not the product of a Russian fantasy," concluded the English historian.

The English Military Command even before Germany's unconditional surrender expressed the transition to the new course of the English ruling circles. It not only collected and stockpiled German weapons but also contributed to carrying out the already clear political line of the ruling circles in the Western powers of establishing postwar collaboration with German militarists.

The Soviet Union guessed the intentions of the English prime minister and Washington which was interested in having the USSR as an ally in the war against Japan put pressure on Churchill. On 23 May 1945, the English military police arrested Donitz and his entire administrative staff totaling some 300 men.

But Churchill did not touch the German soldiers. As before, they were considered to be not prisoners of war but "unarmed military personnel." Moreover, Churchill ordered Alan Brooke "to study the possibilities of opening military operations against Russia, should difficulties arise in the course of the further talks."¹⁹ The situation changed somewhat in mid-July 1945, when Churchill was defeated in the parliamentary elections. A new British prime minister, the laborite C. Attlee, arrived in Potsdam. At the conference, he carried out the same political line as Churchill but was not burning with desire to carry out the adventuristic plan of his predecessor.

Militant Circles in the United States Viewed the Atomic Bomb as the Main Argument and as the Main Means of Military Policy.

The military strategists continued to work out dangerous plans. In the secret files of the U.S. Defense Department, there was a growing number of strategic variations for a military confrontation with the USSR.

The first document directly aimed against the USSR was the Memorandum of the Joint Intelligence Committee No. 329 of 4 September 1945. It should be noted that this was drawn up the day after the official conclusion of World War II. It stated: "To select approximately 20 of the most important targets suitable for strategic atomic bombing, in the USSR and on territory controlled by it." The implementation of this action would have led to the death of 13 million persons. The apogee of the first Cold War, in the words of Halliday, was approaching.

On 19 September 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the idea of an American nuclear strike against the potential enemy. The first strike (it was to be preemptive, preventive, and disabling) was to become an obsession in working out all strategic concepts and plans for the use of the Armed Forces (to win the war with minimum losses). In 1949, the American strategists worked out the Dropshot Plan with the intention to drop 300 atomic bombs in the first strike on 100 cities in the Soviet Union. Some 65 million Soviet people would be doomed to death. In March 1954, the Strategic Air Command considered itself ready to hurl 750 atomic bombs from all corners of the world against the USSR.

Why couldn't the American hawks carry out this evil Dropshot Plan?

At that time, the United States consciously did not use the opportunity to achieve world domination, asserted R. Reagan, in concealing the policy of preparing for Star Wars behind a traditional verbal smokescreen of peacefulness. However, not only many Americans but also other sources reject this assertion.

The Dropshot Plan proceeded from the assumption that the United States would possess military superiority, at least in nuclear weapons, and could use its advantage of the factor of "geographic invulnerability." It was discovered that the set goals were beyond the capabilities as a surprise nuclear attack did not guarantee the United States its own security. As is known, the USSR was forced to adopt measures in response. In 1949, the U.S. atomic monopoly was eliminated. In 1953, the Soviet Union tested a hydrogen weapon and 2 year later an intercontinental ballistic missile was tested. In 1957, the first Sputnik was launched. In 1959, the Strategic Rocket Troops were established. The United States had lost its geographic invulnerability, as there were no unreachable targets for the intercontinental missiles. The American politicians and strategists were confronted with the threat of a major or total war which would be dangerous for themselves.

The Soviet Union's elimination of the former American military-technical superiority dealt a crushing blow to the American policy of "from a position of strength." Even during the first months of his presidency, R. Nixon was forced to admit this fait accompli. The former U.S. advantage in nuclear weapons had been dissipated like smoke. A bitter reality remained: the impossibility of achieving victory over the Soviet Union by military means. A brief period of a lessening of tension in Soviet-American relations began and this reached its peak in the mid-1970s.

Thus, the war years grow more and more distant from us but the number of facts which show that the foundation of the Cold War policy of the United States and England was laid even before its concluding stage, has been constantly growing. In the course of the war, prominent American and English political and military leaders confided their secret plans to their diaries or voiced these

only in a narrow circle of like thinkers. After the war the U.S. ruling circles made no secret of the political goal which they were pursuing: "to dominate in the 21st Century."²⁰

By the end of 1945, the American and English governments refused postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union and "were the first to show their armored fist and the first to violate joint decisions."²¹ Even 4 months after the end of World War II and even before Churchill's Fulton speech, Truman on 5 January 1946 announced the beginning of a new line in American policy. The idea of the announcement came down to making no compromises whatsoever with the Soviet Union but rather carry out a hard course.

The aggressive course of the militant American circles was named the policy of the Cold War, from a position of strength, brinkmanship, psychological warfare and local wars. The credo of American imperialism was defined: "The law of strength: I need, I want, I take."²²

The genesis and apogee of the first Cold War did not bring the main thing to its organizers and instigators as they did not achieve a weakening of socialism. The American historian Halliday writes that the U.S. had to be satisfied with the creation of NATO and with the fact that it had become the "political, military and cultural leader" of the so-called free world.

3. The Ideological Cover for the Cold War

The American military strategists in the document of the Joints Chief of Staff of 9 April 1947 had already thought up justification for their aggressive plans: "War out of ideological motives." However, the Cold War went beyond the realm of ideology. The war plans established the idea of eliminating the USSR from the world scene as a great power. The Memorandum of the Security Council of 7 March 1948 proposed recording that "the defeat of the forces of world communism led by the Soviet Union is of vitally important significance for American security."²³ In this document the United States assumed the leading role in achieving the set goal. The military content of the Cold War strategy included methods of action below the threshold of a war and the war itself.

The Myth of the "Soviet Military Threat" Was a Convenient Ideological Justification for the Cold War.

The American historian MacCarthy in the book "America's Retreat From Victory" writes that ideologically "World War III began with the Russian victory at Stalingrad."²⁴ Even in 1943, bourgeois propaganda have begun to assert that the victories of the Soviet Army were "new turning points" in the conscience and conduct of the Soviet political leadership "which intensified the spirit of expansionism."

These victories, asserts a leading co-worker at the Brookings Institute, S. Kaplan, instilled a belief in the Soviet

soldiers in an ability "to conquer all democratic countries." After 1943, S. Kaplan continues, the "Soviet threat to the West has constantly grown."²⁵ The American historian D. Middleton also seeks the sources of the "Soviet military threat" in the results of the Battle of Stalingrad. "The way was open for the Soviet Union to establish subsequently dominance in Eastern Europe..."²⁶ "The Soviet military threat," asserts the book of the American historian T. Halper, "began to emerge evermore clearly in the form of increasing military might and the strategic offensive by the Red Army to the West."²⁷ Thus, bourgeois sovietologists and historians have formed a modern myth about the "Soviet military threat" in justification for the switch of the U.S. and English ruling circles to the postwar policy of a Cold War, "from a position of strength" and "brinkmanship."

In the Last Stage of the War in Europe the Organizers of Anti-Soviet Propaganda Formed an "Image of the New Enemy" in the Person of the Soviet Soldier Who Had Carried the Main Burden of the Fight Against the Nazi Aggressor.

For example, W. Bullitt in September 1944 frightened the Americans with the fact that "Western civilization is being threatened by hordes of invaders coming from the east."²⁸ This thesis has run through bourgeois historiography up to our days. For example, we might refer to the professor at the University of Pennsylvania, W. Kintner, who has written that the Soviet Union "is expansionistic by nature, harshly repressive...a depraved and wicked empire."²⁹

The strategic target of our ideological opponents is understandable: to eradicate from the awareness of hundreds of millions of people in the world the heroic image of the Soviet liberator soldier who saved world civilization from Nazi slavery. Nevertheless, in the war years even those who did not consider themselves to be the friend of the USSR were forced openly to recognize the accomplishments of the Soviet soldiers who reached Western Europe as liberators. For example, D. Nelson, the chairman of the Board for U.S. Military Production Affairs, wrote: "No army, of course, merited greater admiration and gratitude from the freedom-loving peoples than the Red Army."³⁰

The U.S. political leaders had every reason to understand the futility of frightening the public with the Soviet military threat. The American historian, W. Lafeber (a professor at Cornell University), in the book "America, Russia and the Cold War" quotes a curious document, a report from the U.S. intelligence agencies submitted to President Truman at the end of 1945. On the basis of this report, Lafeber concludes that President Truman could not have had any concern over the question of the "Soviet military threat."

The designated book also gives the text of a speech by Gen G. Patton (the former commander of the 3d American Army) at the end of 1945 to the war college cadets. The general exhorted the youth: "You are the soldiers of the next war. Understand that there will be another

war."³¹ Like Churchill, even at this time he was ready to go to war against the Soviet Union together with the German imperialists, using the help of the German troops.

Truman Effectively Carried Out Extensive Preparations for a New War in Which the "Communist Devil" in the Form of the Soviet Union Was Depicted as the Main Opponent of the United States.

Under this pretext, the United States was the first to deploy its nuclear forces in Western Europe and created the NATO military bloc. Naturally, the Soviet Union was forced to undertake adequate defensive measures.

D. Eisenhower also knew the real situation. In the very first reports to the new president, the CIA stated that "no threat existed to the United States" from the USSR. Lafeber writes that both Eisenhower and J. Dulles were not afraid of a "Soviet military threat" since it did not actually exist. Dulles always spoke about this "threat" with a smile. Nevertheless, the permanent propaganda campaigns to discredit socialism continued.

In turn, the Soviet Union was also to carry out an extensive campaign to explain its policy of peace and security and unmask the bourgeois myths and falsifications.

As a result of the Cold War initiated by the American leaders, obstacles were created on the way to talks on peaceful collaboration in the economic and cultural area as well as the limitation of weapons and disarmament. Precisely the Truman Administration fanned the flames of the Cold War. In the diaries of Forrestal who at that time was the secretary of the navy and later the U.S. secretary of defense, there is a note dating to 1 May 1945. Forrestal entrusted to paper a firm decision taken by certain U.S. circles which was to counter the "Russian influence" by all forces. On 10 May 1945, the deputy secretary of state, J. Grew, stated that "a future war with Russia is inevitable" and for this reason it is essential to decisively turn the American awareness to a confrontation with the Soviets and keep the Armed Forces in a state of readiness for action.³² However, the officials in the Truman Administration at that time refrained from public anti-Soviet attacks. This was explained by the fact that war against Japan was still going on. Truman later in his memoirs hinted at this reason: "Military political collaboration with Russia was still so important that the time was not ripe...for a public statement."³³ The United States was in acute need of Soviet military aid to force Japan into an unconditional surrender. In addition, some time was needed to free the minds of Americans from the popular foreign policy course of the Roosevelt Administration and inoculate the virus of fear of the "Russian bear."

The U.S. and British ruling circles began to isolate out the forces of the anti-Nazi coalition in the period of preparing for the constituent conference of the United

Nations (April-June 1945). The United States intended to employ this organization as a tool for pressuring the Soviet Union.

In speaking at the conference, the American representative A. Vandenberg developed the idea of the leading role of the United States in the postwar peace settlement. This was the first step to establishing the NATO military organization.

In the course of the Potsdam Conference, Truman received a message on the successful testing of an atomic bomb at the Alamogordo Range. And on 24 July 1945, he "casually mentioned to Stalin" that the United States had "a new weapon of extraordinary destructive force." This was the first attempt at a psychological effect for political purposes. The American sovietologist V. Bush was being frank when he openly said that "the bomb was developed at the most essential time in order to put an end to the need to make any concessions to the Russians at the end of the war."³⁴

The Secretary of State J. Byrnes, the American journalist C. Mee has written in his book "Meeting at Potsdam" in the course of the Potsdam Conference shared his plan with Churchill: the bomb would be employed in the aim of "making the Russians more conciliatory in Europe." Even stronger terms were used: "to dictate conditions at the end of the war."

The stir caused by the appearance of the "miracle weapon" at that period could be based solely on the fact of the testing of two atomic bombs. This might restrain actions but not emotions.

Churchill's speech at Fulton was, in essence, a manifesto of the Cold War with fierce ideological engagements already occurring on its fronts. It armed the heralds of the Cold War with the main stereotypes for anti-Soviet propaganda of the postwar times. "A shadow has fallen on the land which recently was eliminated by the victory of the Allies," said Churchill, drawing a picture using the hues of the Apocalypse. And the farther the more terrible the described picture appeared: "the communist parties or the 'fifth columns' everywhere represent a threat to Christian civilization.... At present, there is a favorable opportunity to put an end to the Soviets. Be careful as there may not be enough time."³⁵

Recently the bourgeois mass information media have propagandized the thesis that the program adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress for accelerating the socioeconomic development of Soviet society is aimed primarily at "accelerating preparations for war." The United States supposedly "has been forced" to take "measures of response" to strengthen its own "defenses" when confronted with the "terrifying pace" in the build-up of Soviet military might. The journals have published materials which endeavor to persuade the reader that "the enemies are on the offensive" while America "is defending itself."

It is perfectly obvious that the myth of the "defense" of America has again been taken up by the propagandists of the American military industrial complex with good reason. The well-known political scientist and professor at the University of Montreal (Canada), P. Nelman, on the basis of using numerous facts and documents, concludes that the representatives of the U.S. Republican Administration speak a great deal about "defense" and on any occasion appeal to God. But in practice? They have been the initiators of the shifting of the arms race into space, again forcing the USSR to take measures in response.

The Soviet Union does not threaten America. In its very nature, aggressive wars are alien to a socialist society. The Soviet all-encompassing disarmament program serves as proof of the exclusively defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine. Its core is the proposals to destroy nuclear weapons before the end of the 20th Century and prevent the militarization of space.

Major changes have occurred in the 1980s in international relations, including in the military strategic situation. The nuclear space age has turned the contradictions in social structures into a problem of the survival of mankind. The question of war and peace has become a terrible dilemma and undoubtedly a more dangerous one than that which confronted civilization at the end of the 1930s. The further fate of mankind now depends completely upon the ability of the world community to exclude war as a means of resolving state, economic, political, national or international problems.

The Occurring Process of Turning From the Principle of Overarming to the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency Is Not to the Liking of the Ultraconservative Forces in the United States.

They are feverishly intensifying their activities and spreading skepticism, endeavoring to impose on the new American administration a policy of returning to the worst times of the Cold War. For example, one of the "think tanks" of the American establishment, the Heritage Foundation, in 1988 published a book entitled "Mandate to Leadership. Political Strategy of the 90s." On the 900 pages, the author collective of some 400 persons endeavored to show the need to eliminate everything positive which had been achieved over the last 3 years, to revive the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and confirm the thesis of the "victorious West," thereby justifying the very Cold War. The line of argument has been taken from the arsenal of the Cold War warriors of some 40 years ago. Their groundlessness has been shown by the realities of our life.

Thus, it is still too early to switch to euphoria. The Cold War is going but it is not still a matter of the past.

At the jubilee 40th anniversary session of the NATO Council, a declaration was adopted which "to a significant degree is caught up in the old philosophy, the philosophy of the Cold War, although in places this has been done in new packaging and in new verbal terms.

There it is still a question of deterrence by relying on nuclear weapons, the wagering on force and so forth."³⁶

The near future will tell whether the ultraconservative forces will be able to gain the upper hand over reason. For now, the Pentagon is working at the former pace to carry out the long-term Star Wars Program. The past reminds us: "People, be vigilant." This is why it is beneficial to recall the past for the sake of the future. One would like to believe that this time a realistic approach will gain the upper hand. In modern times, guaranteeing peace remains the superior goal of Soviet foreign policy. In contrast to the past, at present the question of "war or peace" has been transformed into the more significant problem of "either peace or the destruction of all mankind." The 27th CPSU Congress established the idea of creating an all-encompassing international security system. The Soviet program for nuclear disarmament before the end of the 20th Century has encountered a strong response and support throughout the world. Under its influence, new political thinking has been formed in the nuclear age and the core of this is the primacy of common human values, without touching on the ideological aspect. Everyone must take this into account in proceeding if nothing else from common sense.

Footnotes

1. F. Halliday, "Making of the Second Cold War," Washington, 1983, p 2.
2. PRAVDA, 30 December 1988.
3. The "Oxford Dictionary of the English Language" defines the Cold War as a state of tension in state relations, when threats, obstructions, propaganda and other forms of psychological effect are employed but without the physical violation of peace. The American historian S. Gibbons links the term Cold War with the idea of the 19th Century concerning "spheres of influence" finding the difference only in the broadening of the spheres and increasing the danger of the policy as a result of the change in modern communications and weapons. (S. Gibbons, "The Cold War," New York, 1986, p 136).
4. W. Lafeber, "America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1984," New York, 1985, p 17.
5. L. Bezymenskiy, V. Falin, "Who Unleashed the Cold War?" PRAVDA, 29 August 1988.
6. "The Memoires of Harry S. Truman," New York, Vol 1, 1955, p 72; Dath R. Palm, "Problemy sovremennoy istorii" [Problems of Modern History], translated from the English, Moscow, 1956, p 56.
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9. H. Sammes, "Picture of Patton," New York, 1955, pp 276, 283.
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13. B. Montgomery, "The Memoires" London, 1958, p 324.
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24. J. MacCarthy, "America's Retreat From Victory," New York, 1952, p 31.
25. S. Kaplan, "Diplomacy of Power," New York, 1981, p 7.
26. D. Middleton, "Cross-Roads of Modern Warfare," New York, 1983, p 134.
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29. W. Kintner, "Soviet Global Strategy," Fairfax, NY, 1987, p 260.
30. PRAVDA, 24 February 1944.
31. W. Lafeber, op. cit., p 25.
32. G. Grew, "The Turbulent Era," New York, Vol 2, 1958, p 1446.
33. H. Truman, "The Memories," Vol 1, p 25.

34. PROGRESSIVE, August 1965, p 13.
35. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES, March 9-16, London, 1946, pp 7770-7771.
36. "Press Conference of M.S. Gorbachev in Bonn," PRAVDA, 16 June 1989.
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HELP FOR THOSE STUDYING MILITARY HISTORY

Crimean, Far Eastern Campaigns to Eliminate White Guard Armies Viewed

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27-35

[Article by Col V.O. Daynes, candidate of historical sciences: "The End of the White Guard; the Defeat of Wrangel and the Expulsion of Japanese Interventionists From the Far East"]

[Text] Soviet Russia entered the year 1920 in the flames of battle: in the east the defeat of the troops of Adm A.V. Kolchak and the liberation of Western Siberia were being completed, in Central Asia a fight was underway against the Basmack bands in the southeast and south the elimination of the volunteer and Don White Guard armies of Gen A.I. Denikin was being continued while in the west a new war was pending with bourgeois-landowner Poland. The government of bourgeois-landowner Poland, having refused peace talks, on 25 April began military operations against Soviet Russia. The Polish troops, in benefiting from numerical superiority, even at the beginning of May had reached the Pripyat and the Dnieper and had occupied Kiev. Units of the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA] halted their further advance and then went over to a counteroffensive approaching Warsaw and Lvov directly. But this offensive was not properly supported with reserves, transport and ammunition. As a result, the Warsaw Operation of the Western Front ended in a failure. The Lvov Operation of the Southwestern Front was also unsuccessful. The Soviet troops had to retreat, in being heavily engaged by superior enemy forces. On 12 October in Riga, the belligerents agreed to a truce, signing 5 months later the Riga Peace Treaty according to which the western lands of the Ukraine and Belorussia were ceded to Poland.

Thus, by the second half of 1920, two main centers of Civil War and intervention remained: in Northern Tavia and the Crimea where the White Guard troops of Gen Wrangel were; in the Transbaykal, Maritime and Far East, where the Japanese occupation troops, the White Guard units of Ataman Semenov and the undefeated vestiges of the Kolchak Army remained.

The White Guard army of Gen P.N. Wrangel, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet

Republic Armed Forces S.S. Kamenev, "represented a completely special enemy in terms of its character, its unity, in terms of the conditions of that area where the combat occurred. Wrangel, a militarily able commander, had assembled an army from the remnants of the Armed Forces in the south of Russia and this army represented a serious enemy."¹ The ruling circles of the entente nations provided Wrangel with significant diplomatic, financial and military aid. The French government, for example, on 7 October issued orders to its fleet to leave the Mediterranean for the Black Sea for supporting the White Guards. The United States supplied Wrangel with 436 machine guns, over 3,000 rifles and 2.5 million cartridges.² He was also given the weapons and ammunition abandoned in World War I in Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. For example, just Bulgaria supplied 38,000 rifles and 64 million cartridges.³

At the beginning of June 1920, the troops of Gen Wrangel broke out of the Crimea into Northern Tavia and in September initiated an attempt to capture the Donbass and the Right Bank Ukraine. Having suffered a defeat, Wrangel decided to go over to the defensive along the left bank of the Dnieper and on the Melitopol fortified positions in order to repulse the Soviet troop offensive. Subsequently, he proposed launching a counterstrike in the flank of the Red Army main forces, to rout them and create good conditions for continuing the fight. In the event of a defeat, he planned to pull the army back into the Crimea and prevent a breakthrough into the peninsula by the Soviet troops.

For defeating the Wrangel White Guard Army, the Politburo of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee on 2 August 1920 adopted a decree to establish the Southern Front. On 8 September, V.I. Lenin forwarded a note to the chairman of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council [RVSR] I.D. Trotsky with the following contents: "...Should we not appoint Frunze as the front commander opposite Wrangel and send Frunze out immediately. I asked Frunze to speak with you as soon as possible. Frunze says that he has studied the Wrangel Front, he has prepared for this front and knows (from the Ural's Oblast) the methods for fighting against the Cossacks."⁴ On 20 September, V.I. Lenin received M.V. Frunze in the Kremlin, he informed him of the situation in the south of the country and issued instructions to complete the defeat of the enemy before the onset of winter. On the following day, the RVSR adopted the decree: "Due to the arising situation on the Western and Southwestern Fronts, the RVSR has decreed:

"1. To organize a new (southern) front consisting of the 6th and 13th Armies and the 2d Horse Army.

"2. Comrade Frunze has been appointed commander of the Southern Front and Comrade Gusev is the member of this front's RVS [revolutionary military council]."⁵ On 4 October, B. Kun was appointed the member of the front's RVS, on the 16th, M.K. Vladimirov, on the 25th

I.T. Smilga. The front's staff was headed by P.P. Karatygin and from 27 September I.Kh. Pauka.

To reinforce the Southern Front shifted from the interior military districts and from other fronts were the 1st Horse Army, five rifle and two cavalry divisions, four brigades, artillery, armored vehicles, a motor vehicle-tank detachment and over 130,000 men were sent as reinforcements.⁶ The front also included the rebel army of N.I. Makhno. The front's RVS maintained close ties and coordinated the actions of the regular troops with the partisan rebel army of the Crimea under the command of A.V. Mokrousov.⁷ By 27 October, the Southern Front included the 1st and 2d Horse Armies, the 4th, 6th and 13th Armies and numbered 99,500 bayonets and 43,700 sabers against 20,800 bayonets and 17,000 sabers in the White Guard Army of Gen Wrangel.⁸

The plan for defeating the enemy in Northern Tavria had been worked out by the command and the staff of the Southern Front with the participation of the Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev and the chief of the RVS Field Staff P.P. Lebedev. The plan was by a strike with the 1st and 2d Horse Armies, along axes converging in the area of Verkhniye and Nizhniye Serogozы together with a portion of the forces from the 6th Army, to surround and destroy the enemy.⁹

In the course of preparing for the counteroffensive, enormous work was done to indoctrinate the commanders and Red Armymen in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, to explain to them the forthcoming combat tasks and to increase the vanguard role of the communists who comprise 16,771 men, or almost 12 percent of the total number of the front's fighters.¹⁰ Through the partisans, the underground members and special agents in the White Guard units, they disseminated the "Appeal to the Officers of Baron Wrangel's Army," leaflets "Soldiers of the Wrangel Army!" the appeal "Soldiers and Officers of the Wrangel Army!" and other materials containing appeals to halt the fratricidal war and come over to the side of the Red Army. The Appeal of the Southern Front RVS to the Soldiers and Commanders of 24 October stated: "The enemy, having suffered a number of cruel defeats in recent battles, has been broken and is again ready to retreat into the Crimea, feeling the impending death. Our task is to prevent this retreat. By a well-coordinated and rapid thrust by all the armies of the front, it is essential to rout the enemy personnel and break into the Crimea on the heels of the fleeing White Guards. The campaign can be ended with a single thrust and to carry this out is our duty to the entire nation and to ourselves. In no instance should there be a winter campaign."¹¹

In the morning of 28 October, the main forces of the Southern Front went over to a counteroffensive. The troops of the 6th Army under the command of A.I. Kork defeated the II Army Corps and by the end of the following day had reached Perekop. The troops of the 51st Rifle Division under V.K. Blyukher were endeavoring without a pause to capture the Turets Rampart but

under heavy artillery and machine gun fire were forced to hit the dirt. On this day the 455th Rifle Regiment of this division particularly distinguished itself and for this was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner.

The 2d Horse Army under the command of F.K. Mironov, in cooperation with the 52d Rifle Division of M.Ya. Germanovich over a period of 2 days advanced slowly, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance. The troops of the 4th Army under the command of V.S. Lazarevich and the 13th Army (commander I.P. Uborovich) were also heavily engaged with the Wrangel troops, trying to prevent them from reaching the Chongar Isthmus. The 1st Horse Army of S.M. Budenny committed to battle on the morning of 29 October came out deep in the enemy rear. Two of its divisions were fighting in the Agayman area, a third near Rozhdestvenskiy and the fourth further south, on the Black Seacoast. Seemingly, favorable conditions had been established for the surrounding and defeat of the Wrangel troops in Northern Tavria. "The escape routes to Perekop have been cut off," reported M.V. Frunze to V.I. Lenin on 29 October, "and only one road to Salkovo remains open to the enemy. I feel that the outcome of the battle to the north of the isthmus can already be considered determined in our favor. I have issued orders to carry out the second and last task of the front, to capture the Crimean Peninsula."¹²

Wrangel, in endeavoring to avoid encirclement in Northern Tavria, used the remaining open road to Salkovo and began to concentrate in the Agayman area, the cavalry units, the Drozdov, Markov and Kornilov infantry divisions. In order to cut the road to Salkovo, the 4th Cavalry Division of S.K. Timoshenko of the 1st Horse Army was sent there and this division succeeded in taking Genichesk. However, due to the lack of forces it was unable to check the thrust of the superior enemy which during the night of 2 November succeeded in breaking into the Crimea. The attempt by the 6th Cavalry Division of O.I. Gorodovikov and the 30th Rifle Division of I.K. Gryaznov to break into the peninsula via Sivash and Chongar also did not succeed. How events developed on this sector can be seen from an excerpt from the order awarding the 265th Regiment of the 30th Rifle Division the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner: "After a quick march without halts, regardless of the great physical fatigue caused by the 2-days' travel without rest and food, the regiment, having repulsed the enemy counterattack, went over to a decisive offensive against Rykovo Station, ousted the enemy and pursuing the latter, some 5 versts from Rykovo Station cut into the enemy column and captured, in addition to other equipment, 12 guns. The enemy retreated in panic, abandoning a mass of weapons, ammunition and food."¹³

On 3 November, the Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev in speaking over the direct wire with M.V. Frunze pointed out that "on the Sivash Isthmus we were not on the heels of the enemy but a certain distance from

it. Whatever the case, continue with all measures to attempt to break into the Crimea, as that would be very annoying...."¹⁴

After the defeat in Northern Tavria, Gen Wrangel intended by a stubborn defense to wear down the Southern Front and prevent the troops from breaking through into the Crimean Peninsula. For this purpose, he concentrated here up to 41,000 bayonets and sabers, over 2,000 guns, up to 20 armored vehicles, 3 tanks and 5 armored trains.¹⁵ On the Perekop sector, he established two fortified zones: the Perekop which was based upon the Turets Rampart and the Yushun (Ishun) which included six lines of trenches with communications trenches, concrete machine gun nests and shelters. The Turets Rampart and the terrain adjacent to it was provided with full-height trenches, machine gun and artillery firing positions with strong shelters connected by communications trenches. The approaches to the defensive positions were covered by wire obstacles which could be covered by solid small arms and machine gun fire. On the Chongar Isthmus and the Arabat Spit there were five or six lines of trenches covered by wire obstacles while the defenses on the Litovskiy Peninsula were considered the enemy's weaker as here there were just two lines of trenches (Diagram 1).

The operation was prepared under exceptionally difficult conditions: the army rears had lagged behind, there was mud and a lack of roads which impeded the delivery of reinforcements, ammunition and food as well as the prompt shifting of heavy artillery weapons essential for the destruction of the defensive works. "To this one must add the unusually cold weather which set in with frosts reaching to 10 degrees," recalled M.V. Frunze, "while the enormous majority of the troops did not have warm clothing and was forced at the same time to remain constantly under the open skies."¹⁶

The offensive commenced during the night of 8 November. The assault group of the 6th Army with a 15-degree frost, in icy water crossed the 8-km Sivash Bay over three fords, it breached the enemy defenses and rushed toward the Ishun positions in the rear of the Perekop grouping. Caught by surprise, the enemy began to hurriedly shift to the Litovskiy Peninsula reserves and a portion of the I Army Corps from the Perekop Isthmus.

Units of the 51st Rifle Division after 4-hour artillery softening up and with the support of 15 armored vehicles, in the morning of 8 November, began the storming of the Turets Rampart, but the Wrangel troops drove off three frontal assaults with machine gun and artillery fire.

The situation had also grown more complicated on the Litovskiy Peninsula where as a result of high tide, water began to flow into the Sivash. The assault group of the 6th Army was threatened with complete isolation. M.V. Frunze immediately sent the 7th and 16th Cavalry Divisions of the 2d Horse Army and a horse detachment of the Rebel Army to aid it. At 0400 hours during the night of 9 November, the 51st Rifle Division began a

new assault on Perekop. "With unbelievable effort, surmounting enormous difficulties with the offensive on Perekop," commented the order to award the 456th Rifle Regiment the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner, "under murderous enemy fire and regardless of the presence of several lines of wire obstacles, the regiment, loyal to revolutionary duty and showing miracles of bravery, with a strong blow broke the enemy resistance, captured the Perekop Rampart and forced the enemy to retreat to Armyansk."¹⁷

At that time, the Soviet troops which had advanced on the Litovskiy Peninsula intensified the pressure, forcing the Wrangel troops to weaken the defenses on the Perekop sector and begin a retreat. During the night of 11 November, the 30th Rifle Division in cooperation with the 6th Cavalry Division breached the Chongar fortifications, exploiting the success on the Dzhankoy axis. The 2d Horse Army committed to battle by decisive action turned the enemy horse corps to flight.

In endeavoring to avoid excessive casualties, M.V. Frunze proposed to Gen Wrangel that the senseless resistance be ceased and arms put down. The White Guard Command rejected this proposal and concealed it from its soldiers. Then the armies of the Southern Front began pursuing the enemy: the 1st Horse Army and 6th Army on the axis of Yevpatoriya, Simferopol, Sevastopol; the 4th Army toward Feodosiya and Kerch; the 2d Horse Army to Simferopol and Yalta. The partisans intensified actions in the enemy rear. Units from Makhno's Rebel Army, instead of participating in the pursuit, engaged in plundering and the front's command was forced to send a portion of the forces to neutralize it.

On 16 November, M.V. Frunze telegraphed V.I. Lenin: "Today our cavalry has taken Kerch. Southern Front liquidated."¹⁹ The remnants of the White Army on transport vessels under the cover of Entente naval vessels fled to Constantinople. As a total, up to 150,000 persons were evacuated from the Crimea along with refugees, including around 70,000 soldiers and officers.²⁰

The victory of the Southern Front was highly praised by V.I. Lenin. "You know, of course, what unusual heroism has been shown by the Red Army," he said, "having surmounted such obstacles and such fortifications which even military specialists and authorities considered untouchable. One of the most brilliant pages in the history of the Red Army is that complete, decisive and remarkably quick victory which was won over Wrangel. Thus, the war imposed on us by the White Guards and imperialists has been eliminated."²¹ The divisions which particularly distinguished themselves were given honorific designators: the 15th Rifle Division Sivash, the 51st Rifle Perekop, the 30th Rifle and 6th Cavalry Chongar. Several thousand persons were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Diagram 1.




Diagram 1.

- Key:
- 1--Turets Rampart (main position on Perekop)
 - 2--Perekop, Ishun, Chongar and along the edge of Lake Sivash
 - 3--Axes of Soviet troop thrusts on 7-11 Nov against Perekop and Ishun fortifications and 11-12 Nov against Chongar fortifications
 - 4--Counterstrikes and retreat of Wrangel troops
 - 5--Position of Soviet troops by end of 11 Nov
 - 6--Operational areas of Crimean partisans
 - 7--Pursuit of Wrangel troops into Crimea 12-17 Nov
 - 8--Evacuation of remnants of White Guard troops and refugees to Turkey on 17 Nov

After the elimination of the Wrangel threat, the Soviet Republic was able to move to peaceful socialist construction and take measures to liberate the Far East.

During the fighting of the Red Army against the troops of bourgeois-landowner Poland and the White Guard Army of Gen Wrangel, the Soviet government had endeavored to avoid a direct military clash with Japan. V.I. Lenin thus described the situation which existed at that time: "...We cannot wage a war against Japan and we should do everything to try not only to delay war with Japan but, if possible, dispense with it, because for understandable reasons it is at present beyond us."²² For this reason, the RKP(b) Central Committee and the Soviet government in April 1920, adopted a decision to form the Far Eastern Republic (DVR) on the territory of the Transbaykal, Amur and Maritime Oblasts and this would be a democratic state in form, that is, a buffer between Soviet Russia and Japan. On 15 July, at Gongota Station (120 km to the west of Chita), representatives of the DVR government and the command of the Expeditionary Japanese Army signed a treaty for truce and for establishing a neutral zone between the Japanese Army and the People's Revolutionary Army (NRA)²³ and for evacuating Japanese troops from the Transbaykal area and the Amur area.²⁴ According to the treaty conditions, the DVR government did not have the right to employ its armed forces for combating the White Guards in the Central Transbaykal Area (this task was assigned to the partisan Amur Front formed in April 1920 under the command of S.M. Seryshev and which liberated Chita on 22 October).

On 28 October in Chita, at a conference of the representatives of the Far Eastern oblasts, the unification of the region was completed and on 10 November, the DVR government was formed headed by A.M. Krasnoshchekov. At the end of November, at the Constituent Assembly of the DVR, its constitution was adopted and a council of ministers elected headed by P.M. Nikiforov. In accord with the Gongota Treaty, the Japanese troops were to leave the Transbaykal area by 15 October and Khabarovsk by 21 October 1920, without losing at the same time the hope of remaining in the Far East. In March-April 1921, the Japanese Command in Port Arthur and Peking conducted a conference with the leaders of the White Guard armed formations and worked out a plan for military operations against the RSFSR and the DVR. The plan envisaged a simultaneous invasion by White Guard detachments from Mongolia and Manchuria into the Transbaykal area, the Amur Oblast and Siberia as well as armed action by the forces of internal counterrevolution in the Maritime area. On 26 May in the Maritime area, with the support of Japanese troops, a counterrevolutionary coup was carried out and a government came to power headed by the former tsarist official S.D. Merkulov. It organized its own Armed Forces and these included three corps from the former army of Gen G.M. Semenov, detachments of the Baron, Gen R.F. Ungern von Shternberg and Wrangel troops moved to the Far East after the defeat in the Crimea; a total of up to 19,500 men.²⁵

The threat hanging over the DVR became a matter of review at a session of the Dalburo [Far Eastern Buro] of the RKP(b) Central Committee²⁶ and the Third Far Eastern Regional Party Conference held in June 1921. The conference adopted a decree which obliged all communists to "concentrate on combat tasks immediately, in moving to the forefront the task of creating, strengthening and improving the Army and Navy as the only dependable means of defeating and destroying the Russian reactionary forces in the Far East."²⁷

On 30 June 1921, the DVR government formed the Military Council of the NRA and Navy, appointing V.K. Blyukher as the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces and the war minister of the DVR and with V.I. Burov and M.I. Gubelman as military council members. The troops of the NRA DVR in cooperation with units of the 5th Separate Army of the RSFSR and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MNRA) from the end of May through the middle of June defeated the detachments of Gen Ungern which had invaded the territory of the DVR and completely routed them on the territory of Mongolia. On 6 July, Urga (Ulan-Bator) was liberated, and the government of People's Mongolia moved here. On 5 November 1921, the RSFSR and Mongolia signed an agreement for establishing friendly relations and this was the first equal treaty in the history of Mongolia.

By the beginning of 1922, according to the data of the staff of the NRA and Navy of the DVR, in the Maritime area there were Japanese expeditionary troops under the command of Gen Tachiban consisting of the 9th, 11th and 13th Infantry Divisions, the Sakhalin Expeditionary Detachment and naval forces numbering up to 20,000 soldiers and officers as well as another 23,500 White Guards.²⁸ Gen Molchanov was planning, in relying on the Volochayevka Fortified Area to hold Khabarovsk until the spring of 1922 and then with the support of Japanese troops, go over to an offensive and capture the Far East.

The Volochayevka Fortified Area consisted of deep trenches with ice ramparts, blockhouses and tank traps covered by wire obstacles and small arms-machine gun fire. It was defended by almost 7,500 persons.²⁹ The task of capturing it was assigned to the troops of the Eastern Front of the NRA divided into the Insk and Transbaykal groups with a total size of 7,600 bayonets and sabers. On 10 February 1922, the storming commenced. The composite rifle brigade at 1200 hours attacked the enemy positions on Yunkoran Hill, simultaneously launching a strike against the railroad from the southwest. In committing the reserve regiment to battle, the brigade drove the White Guards out of the western part of Volochayevka while a regiment from the 1st Chita Rifle Brigade approached it from the south.

The decisive assault began in the morning of 12 February. The review of the NRA Staff pointed out: "Resistance was so strong that our units, rushing the enemy wire obstacles, were fired on with grape shot in being

Diagram 2.




Diagram 2

- Key:
- 1--Position of troops of assault group of NRA DVR by end of 3 Oct
 - 2--Lines and defensive areas of White Guard troops
 - 3--White Guard troops of the "Zemskaya Rat"
 - 4--Axes of thrust by troops of NRA DVR 4-7 Oct
 - 5--Position of troops of NRA DVR by morning of 8 Oct
 - 6--Axes of attacks by troops of NRA DVR 8-9 Oct
 - 7--Axes of attacks by troops of NRA DVR 10-15 Oct
 - 8--Axes of attacks and retreat of White Guard troops
 - 9--Pursuit of White Guard troops ("Zemskaya Rat")
 - 10--Commandeering by White Guards of troops from Siberian Fleet from Vladivostok to Pusan and Manila
 - 11--People's Revolutionary Army of Far Eastern Republic

caught in the wire while a light-type tank was instantaneously destroyed.... It was difficult to describe the heroism and courage shown by the men and the command personnel during these difficult days: several nights without sleep, out under the open skies, half dressed and literally starving, they proved themselves to be real revolutionary fighters. On the other hand, our losses in this fighting were around 2,000 men, including over 600 killed."³⁰

The courage and heroism of the soldiers who stormed Volochayevka were properly praised. The Order of the Red Banner was awarded to 67 men, to the 6th Separate Rifle Regiment, the 3d Separate Light Battery and the Armored Train No. 8. Among those decorated was the NRA soldier B. Tsarev who "during the night of 11 February was the first from the 7th Company to rush the wire obstacles, with his rifle butt he broke through the obstacles and with a shout of 'Hurrah!' began to make his way forward thereby leading on his comrades."³¹

On 14 February 1922, the troops of the NRA DVR occupied Khabarovsk and on 18 March, Iman Station. The Japanese Command, having realized that the Merkulov government was incapable of eliminating the DVR and the partisan movement in the Maritime area, in June put in power the monarchist, Gen M.K. Diterikhs, having proclaimed him the "ruler of the Amur Zemstvo Land and the military leader of the "Zemskaya Rat."

The Command of the Eastern Front, after the liberation of Iman Station, pulled its troops back behind the Iman River in order to prevent an armed clash with the Japanese units. The DVR government, in strictly observing the previously reached agreements, endeavored to resolve the disputed questions peacefully. At the beginning of September 1922, in Chanchung a conference was opened for the representatives of the RSFSR, the DVR and Japan. Here special attention was paid to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. However, the hard line taken by the Japanese delegation led to the collapse of the conference. Decisive measures had to be taken to complete the liberation of the Far East. Military operations were intensified in the Maritime area by the partisan detachments, the NRA was reorganized and the 2d Amur and the 1st Transbaykal Rifle Divisions and the Far Eastern Cavalry Brigade were constituted. I.P. Uborevich became the commander-in-chief and war minister of the NRA and Navy of the DVR. Under him were the partisan military areas headed by the military council of the maritime partisan detachments. By 1 October, the NRA numbered over 35,000 men.

In the aim of improving troop command, by orders of I.P. Uborevich an assault group was organized under the command of M.M. Olshanskiy who on 6 October was replaced by Ya.Z. Pokus. On 5 October, the group went over to the offensive, it captured Sviyagino Station and reached Spassk. At dawn of 8 October, the NRA soldiers

and partisans began the storming of the Spassk Fortified Area (Diagram 2). At 1600 hours on 9 October, Spassk had been taken."³²

In exploiting the success, the NRA troops on 15 October liberated Nikolsk-Ussuriyskiy and reached Vladivostok. The commands of the NRA and the Japanese troops reached agreement on permitting the NRA units into the city, and on 25 October, they entered Vladivostok. "The entire population had come out onto the streets to greet our troops," reported I.B. Uborevich to the VRSR. "We were covered in flowers and many were crying from happiness."³⁴

The Japanese occupiers were forced to evacuate the Maritime area, remaining solely in Northern Sakhalin which, in accord with the convention on the basic principles of relations between the USSR and Japan, was cleared by the interventionists only in May 1925.

On 14 November 1922, the DVR People's Assembly declared the establishing of Soviet power in the entire Far East and announced its self-disbandment and turned to the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and to the Congress of Russian Soviets with a request to annex the Far East to the RSFSR. On the following day, the VTsIK Presidium ruled to declare "the Far Eastern Republic within its present boundaries, including the zone occupied by foreign troops, to be an inseparable part of the RSFSR."³⁵

The intense years-long struggle in the Far East ended with victory. The last point in the Civil War was over. In a speech at the Fourth VTsIK Session, Ninth Sitting, on 31 October 1922, V.I. Lenin pointed out: "I feel that our Red Army for a long time to come has freed us from any possible repetition of pressure by the White Guards on Russia or on any of the republics whatsoever, directly or indirectly, closely or more or less distantly linked to us.

"At the same time, we must also say that we must not succumb to extreme complacency as here a role was played not only by the feat of the Red Army and its strength but also by the international situation and our diplomacy."³⁶

Footnotes

1. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (below TsGASA), folio 6, inv. 4, file 559, sheet 1; "The Armed Forces of the South of Russia" was the official name of the army of Gen A.I. Denikin defeated by the troops of the Caucasus Front by April 1920.

2. "Krakh pervogo nashes viya imperialistov na Stranu Sovetov" [Collapse of the First Invasion by the Imperialists of the Soviet Nation], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1973, p 338.

3. TsGASA, folio 101, inv. 1, file 174, sheet 135.

4. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 51, p 276.

5. "M.V. Frunze na Yuzhnom fronte (sentyabr—noyabr 1920 g.): Sb. dokumentov" [M.V. Frunze on the Southern Front (September-November 1920): Collection of Documents], Frunze, Kyrgyzstan, 1988, p. 22.
6. "Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSSR" [Civil War in the USSR], in 2 volumes, Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1986, p. 297.
7. Real name Foma Matveyevich Mokrousov.
8. "Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSSR," Vol 2, p. 306. Data on the enemy are given without counting the 16,000 bayonets and 2,000 sabers in the Crimean Peninsula.
9. "Direktivy komandovaniya frontov Krasnoy Armii (1917-1922): Sb. dokumentov v 4-kh t." [Directives of the Command of the Red Army Fronts (1917-1922): Collection of Documents in Four Volumes], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol III, 1974, pp. 484-485.
10. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR, 1917-1922" [History of the Civil War in the USSR, 1917-1922], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol 5, 1960, p. 199.
11. "M.V. Frunze na Yuzhnom fronte..." p. 151.
12. Ibid., p. 161.
13. "Boyevye podvigi chastei Krasnoy Armii (1918-1922 gg.): Sb. dokumentov" [Combat Feats of the Red Army Units (1918-1922): Collection of Documents], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957, p. 156.
14. "Direktivy komandavniya frontov..." Vol 3, p. 495.
15. "Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSSR," Vol 2, p. 311.
16. M.V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p. 102.
17. "Boyevye podvigi chastei..." p. 173.
18. [Not in text]
19. "M.V. Frunze na Yuzhnom fronte..." p. 208.
20. L.K. Shkarenko, "Agoniya bey emigratsii" [The Agony of the White Emigres], Moscow, Mysl, 1981, p. 17.
21. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 42, pp. 129-130.
22. Ibid., p. 93.
23. The NRA was formed on 10 March 1920 and was called the People's Revolutionary Army of the Baykal Area and from the beginning of April, the NRA of the Transbaykal Area.
24. "Shli divizii vpered. 1920-1921. Narodno-revolutsionnaya armiya v osvobozhdenii Zabaykalya: Sb. dokumentov" [The Divisions Were in Front. 1920-1921. The People's Revolutionary Army in the Liberation of the Transbaykal Area: Collection of Documents], Irkutsk, Vostochno-Sibirskoye Knizhnoye Izd-vo, 1987, pp. 146-148.
25. TsGASA, folio 7, inv. 2, file 226, sheets 21-22.
26. The Far Eastern Bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee was organized upon instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee on 3 March 1920 under the name of the Dalburo of the RKP(b) and which on 13 August was transformed into the Dalburo of the Party Central Committee for leading the party organizations of the DVR.
27. "Borba za vlast Sovetov v Primorye (1917-1922 gg.): Sb. dokumentov" [The Struggle for Soviet Power in the Maritime Area (1917-1922): Collection of Documents], Vladivostok, Primorskoye Knizhnoye Izd-vo, 1955, p. 628.
28. TsGASA, folio 221, inv. 1, file 586, sheets 15-17.
29. "Grazhdanskaya voyna v SSSR," Vol 2, p. 376.
30. "I na Tikhom okeane... 1920-1922. Narodno-revolutsionnaya armiya DVR v osvobozhdenii Priamurya i Primorya: Sb. dokumentov" [And on the Pacific... 1920-1922. The People's Revolutionary Army of the DVR in the Liberation of the Amur and Maritime Areas: Collection of Documents], Irkutsk, Vostochno-Sibirskoye Knizhnoye Izd-vo, 1988, p. 130.
31. TsGASA, folio 117, inv. 1, file 10, sheet 29.
32. "Direktivy komandovaniya frontov..." Vol 4, 1978, p. 243.
33. "I na Tikhom okeane..." p. 190.
34. Ibid., p. 211.
35. Ibid., p. 216.
36. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p. 245.

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VIEWPOINTS, JUDGMENTS, VERSIONS

Early Days of Soviet Defense Ministry Described

904P0004 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 10, Oct 89 (signed to press 6 Oct 89)
pp 37-55

[Article by Col (Ret) M.A. Molodtzygin, candidate of historical sciences, docent: "120 Days of the Narkomvoya: From the History of the Transition to Establishing a Mass Regular Red Army"; conclusion; for first installment see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8 for 1989]

[Text] For questions of defense military specialists are essential.

This phrase was taken from the already-mentioned program document of the Narkomvoya [People's Commissariat of Military Affairs] ("Our Task") published in PRAVDA on 24 March. After it followed the words:

"The difficult situation of Russia...suggests to all honest specialists of military and naval affairs that they must not remain on the sidelines. Soviet power will give them a full opportunity to employ all their forces, knowledge and talents in organizing the nation's defense. The specialists should become instructors, military teachers, and technical leaders in the army. In the military area specifically, they should be given the decisive word and all responsibility should be entrusted to them."

In raising the question of employing old specialists in serving a worker state, Trotsky does not have the first word. Let us recall Engels's conclusion dating to 1851 that the victorious proletariat "will need to win over to its side the largest possible number of officers"¹ as well as his letter to A. Bebel (October 1891), where he points to the possibility of treason by bourgeois specialists. Lenin generally was concerned by this question even before the revolution. In his "Notes on the Organization of the Managerial Apparatus" written by him on 25 or during the night of 26 October 1917, there is the following phrase: "Gen Bonch-Bruyevich will do and raise the principle of generally promoting superiors by the lower ranks."² The second part of this sentence shows why in the first membership of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars], the Narkomvoyen appeared somewhat unusual as a collective body consisting of three persons who previously had held elected positions. But the first part shows that the leader of the revolution clearly realized that without fail there should be an experienced military specialist in leading national defense.

On 28 October, Lt Col M.A. Muravyev (a Leftist Social Revolutionary) was appointed the chief of the defenses of Petrograd and the Petrograd region. Gen A.A. Manikovskiy who had been released from the Peter and Paul Fortress agreed from 30 October to handle the duties of manager of the Defense Ministry under the supervision of N.V. Krylenko. At the first meeting of the Collegium of the Narkomvoyen on 3 November, the question arose of the need to replace Manikovskiy. Candidates were proposed who had completed the General Staff Academy: Gen A.P. Arkhangelskiy who was the chief of the Main Staff and a nonparty person (his candidacy had been proposed by Muravyev), Col M.S. Svechnikov who had been the chief of a division and a Bolshevik since May 1917 (proposed by Antonov-Ovseyenko) and Maj Gen M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, the chief of the Mogilev Garrison and a supporter of Soviet power (his name was put up by Podvoyskiy). Consequently, immediately after October the members of the Collegium of the Narkomvoyen considered it completely natural to collaborate with the old military specialists. How else could one have then solved the problem of military leadership?

However, at the very first session of the Collegium, a varying attitude on the part of its members became apparent over the question of how to employ these specialists. In the decision adopted, for example, there were the following points: all the orders of Muravyev were to be reinforced by the signature of the People's

Commissar for Defense Antonov; Muravyev was to immediately provide the text of all outgoing orders. The professional revolutionaries and the authoritative leaders of the masses of soldiers did not want to abandon the leading position and were unable to permit to leadership those who yesterday had been on the other side of the barricades. We are inclined to see in this the main reason for their differences of opinion over the question of the use of military specialists.

The apogee of these differences was reached in March, when Krylenko in his statement pointed out that the military specialists were unable to understand the particular features of organizing the new armed forces and could only spoil and not organize things. The TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army] has preserved a tape of conversations over the direct wire between N.I. Podvoyskiy and K.A. Mekhonoshin (Petrograd) with N.V. Krylenko (Moscow) and made on 14 or 15 March. In addition to other questions, the "Petrograders" asked the following: "In line with the campaign against the military commissariat, would you not find it necessary for some of us to come to Moscow? Do they inform you of the chess moves and intrigues of the generals and their brothers?... Will you speak at the congress or do you advise one of us to speak giving a sketch of the position of the military commissariat or are the changes in the commissariat not personal but rather depend upon the antigeneral position held by the commissariat?" Krylenko replied that he had "already definitely left the job," that the retirement of Podvoyskiy and the appointment of Trotsky had occurred and that at the congress there would be no "opportunity" to speak; the commissariat collegium should decide whether it considered it possible to remain in their places.³

The question of the military specialists was raised more sharply than in the statement in the report from Krylenko drawn up together with Podvoyskiy. The authors of the note felt that the use of the military specialists would turn over to the "uncontrolled disposal of the former generals" all the crucial posts and along with these also "the right to control the armed forces of the Soviet Republic"; they recognized the use of the specialists only in subordinate positions (chiefs of staff, consultants and so forth) and urged that they be put in a situation where they could "feel the rod over them."⁴ To these "behind-the-scenes" squabbles one must add the outright persecution in the Leftist SR GOLOSE TRUDOVOGO KRESTYANSTVA which had asserted on 30 March 1918 that "the army remains under the command of the generals and officers and under their greatcoat beats a loyal monarchistic heart."

But Trotsky even when at the Narkomindel [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs] repeatedly met and consulted with military specialists. They had participated in working out the military-technical questions of the truce with Germany and later the Brest Peace Treaty. In the course of these measures and at meetings, including under the chairmanship of Lenin, Trotsky came to realize that a number of military specialists

possessed high qualifications, professionalism and a feeling for the new—qualities without which it was impossible to escape from dilettantism and move on to building an army which met modern requirements. It must not be forgotten that in March there occurred in Lenin's expression, "a mass turn in the mood and political behavior in the conduct of the former saboteurs, that is, the capitalists and bourgeois intelligentsia"³ including the military.

In a speech at the session of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] of 22 April and published 2 days later in the IZVESTIYA VTsIK, Trotsky stated that the worker detachments which had fought against the Kaledin, Kornilov and Dutov troops had been able to see for themselves the "weakness of their principle of military organization" when confronted with any organized force based on principles of military art. This now was understood by each conscious worker and in this comprehension of the aware workers, the revolutionary peasants and the Red Armymen, we will draw psychological support in order to begin establishing an army in which we will employ everything that is viable among the old command personnel."

We would err from the truth if we were to assert that everything went smoothly with the resolving of such a complex question which took up so much energy for the Narkomvoyen. In mid-April, certain of the military specialists turned to L.D. Trotsky over the matter of insulting remarks made to them by Zinovyev. The latter, incidentally, had informed Trotsky by telegram⁶ that this had been caused by a distortion of the text of the speech by the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet in the press.⁷ On 26 April, Trotsky appeared in the IZVESTIYA NARKOMVOYENA, having explained the provisions concerning the Republic Armed Forces as approved by the VTsIK. In the first place, he pointed to the necessity of organizing armed forces on the basis of military science and this could be done only with the aid of military specialists and all conditions must be provided for their work. Secondly, the Narkomvoyen emphasized, the armed forces should conform to the nature of worker and peasant power and the commissars must be concerned with this. Thirdly, he concluded, the laboring classes have the right to demand from the military specialists, whatever the political convictions of the latter, a loyal attitude to that regime within which they were carrying out their job. Any abuse of the trust of Soviet power should be met with harsh punishment.

Trotsky was demanding of the military specialists for their execution of duties in serving in the Red Army. It must not be forgotten that there were instances of both direct betrayal, minor disloyalty, an indifferent attitude toward the job and the violating of regulations. These began to grow more frequent when the intervention got underway and begun by the previous allies of Russia. April. May. June. Events then developed rapidly.

From the Order of the Chairman of the Higher Military Council [VVS] and the Narkomvoyenmor [People's

Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs] to the Military and Naval Department, for the Red Army and Red Navy of 13 June 1918 published in the IZVESTIYA VTsIK of 15 June: "...Among the military specialists and former officers serving the Soviet Republic, along with the honest fulfillment of military duty, several instances have been observed of refusing to obey orders relating to tasks of combating the Czechoslovak revolt. Those who refused endeavored to refer to the fact that they had not been called upon to wage a 'civil' war....

"I declare: Soviet power will not tolerate any deviations and arguments from servicemen when confronted with the enemy. All unsuitable and rotten elements who do not show indignation and anger toward the revolt of prisoner foreign mercenaries and against the freedom and independence of Worker and Peasant Russia will be overthrown and those guilty of resistance will be suppressed.

"The current warning is the first and last."

However, let us return to the opposition which favored a different solution to the military question and which formed in the first months of organizing the Red Army. The basic provisions in its platform which contradicted the views of Lenin and Trotsky came down to defending the elective principle, to protests against using the specialists, against introducing iron discipline, the centralizing of the army and so forth. In the personnel of the Narkomvoyen the process of eliminating the opposition was carried out comparatively rapidly. Krylenko left. Podvoyskiy became a member of the VVS. The remaining members of the collegium abandoned further struggle having clearly realized that the line of Trotsky was the line of the party and Lenin.

Structural changes were carried out in the personnel. The All-Russian Collegium on the Organizing of the Red Army which had been unable to develop as a viable, working body and did not have a sufficient number of specialists, upon the decision of the Narkomvoyen, was merged with the General Staff of the old war department. The announcement of this dated 15 April pointed to the necessity of allocating the collegium co-workers over the departments of the General Staff so that they could gain the necessary experience in organizing and managing the armed forces.

The merger was carried out on 8 May, when by the order of the Narkomvoyen the All-Russian Main Staff was formed (N.N. Stogov became its first chief, and he was a military specialist who soon betrayed Soviet power). A.A. Manikovskiy headed the Central Supply Directorate which was organized on 1 June. Subordinate to the given bodies were the corresponding directorates and departments also headed by military specialists. Behind all of this stood the enormous organizational work of the Narkomvoyen and above all Trotsky himself.

It was more difficult to combat the opposition views and actions of the opposition on the spot. Thus, the Urals soviet and military workers were against having the

district headquarters headed by military specialists. A strong opposition grouping was formed in Tsaritsyn. On 6 June 1918, I.V. Stalin arrived here on a mission from the center. In his brief biography we read: "In mercilessly shattering the resistance of the counterrevolutionary specialists sent out and supported by Trotsky, Stalin by quick and decisive measures reorganized the disordered detachments and accelerated the arrival of Voroshilov's units from the Donbass..."⁸

K.Ye. Voroshilov actually from July was in command of a group of troops defending the city. The former junior officers from the peasantry who headed the essentially partisan detachments comprised a receptive environment for fighting against the use of military specialists and other measures to build a regular army.⁹

Trotsky commented in his memoirs: "Stalin spent several months in Tsaritsyn. He combined his behind-the-scenes struggle against me which even then comprised an essential part of his activities with the crude opposition from Voroshilov and his immediate associates. However, Stalin behaved as if at any moment things could go bad."¹⁰

And further:

[Lenin] "Knew Stalin better than I did and clearly suspected that the stubbornness of the Tsaritsyn people was explained by behind-the-scenes string-pulling of Stalin."¹¹

Not long before the Fifth Congress of Soviets, on 27 July 1918, the IZVESTIYA NARKOMVOYENA published an interview of Trotsky with press workers where he drew attention to the fact that the Czechoslovak coup disclosed "military handwork" in the local military administrative bodies and they, like everywhere in the army, needed strict Soviet centralization, the organizing of regular units, combat training and the broad use of all viable military specialists who were ready to work. In the congress decree on the organization of the Red Army adopted on 10 July there is a special point on the need to register and give jobs to the military specialists. A military specialist who works honestly and conscientiously had the right to respect in the army and the support of Soviet power. Those who would endeavor to use their responsible position for counterrevolutionary conspiracy or treachery could expect death.

Were there instances when Lenin had hesitations in the policy toward the military specialists? Obviously yes. One such instance is described in Trotsky's memoirs. This happened during a session of the SNK held in March 1919, during the period of the setbacks on the Eastern Front, when Kolchak was approaching the Volga. Lenin wrote Trotsky a note: "Shouldn't we throw out all the specialists down to a man and appoint Lashevich as commander-in-chief?"¹² Trotsky replied in the negative and after the session there was the following dialogue:

"You ask wouldn't it be better to get rid of all the foreign officers. Do you know how many we have now in the army?"

"I don't."

"Approximate?"

"I don't."

"At least 30,000."

"What?"

"At least 30,000. And for every traitor there are hundreds of reliable persons, for every deserter there are two or three killed. Who is going to replace them?"¹³

This occurred just a year after the former officers and generals began to be widely employed in service in the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army]. Let me quote an excerpt from a work by V.I. Lenin "Successes and Difficulties of Soviet Power" (April 1919):

"When Comrade Trotsky recently informed me that in our military department the number of officers is several tens of thousands, then I gained a specific notion as to what is the secret for employing our enemy: how to force the construction of communism by those who are its enemies..."¹⁴

Keepers of the Higher Interests of the Revolution and Socialism

This was the name given to the military commissars in the appeal of the Narkomvoven of 21 March. The creation of the institution of military commissars was one of the most important aspects in the activity of the Narkomvoven in the course of building the new army. The appeal said:

"Political control over the entire organization and life of the army is entrusted to the military commissars. The post of a military commissar is one of the most responsible and honorable in the Soviet Republic. The commissar maintains the closest internal link between the army and the Soviet regime as a whole. The commissar embodies the principle of revolutionary duty and unflinching discipline. The commissar strengthens all military orders. By the entire force of his authority and his power the commissar ensures the immediate and unswerving execution of the operational and battle orders of the military leaders."¹⁵

The institution of commissars as representatives of revolutionary power was not a new phenomenon in history. Let us recall, for example, the commissars of the Convention Period of the French Revolution (1793). Their duties included, in particular: recruiting soldiers and supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, supervising the command and the military measures, combating counterrevolution and so forth. The commissars of the Provisional Government in Russia (1917) in the rear troop units were concerned with preserving

order and on the front with the strengthening of military discipline, the power of the command personnel and everywhere, combating Bolshevik influence. The Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee began dispatching its commissars to the troop units even on the eve of the armed insurrection and this assumed a mass nature after its victory. The VRK [Military-Revolutionary Committee] commissars were sent to the fronts, to the various regions of the nation and to institutions. During the first months after October, they were the representatives of the revolutionary bodies ensuring the establishment of Soviet power.

At the beginning of the essay, we stated that Lenin and Trotsky had the idea of assigning to the military specialists two commissars from the Bolsheviks (up to July 1918, Leftist SRs were also permitted). The figures here were the major military personnel and the workers of headquarters (if their rank was lower, then one commissar worked with them). Thus, Engr Gen A.V. Shvarts became the military leader of the Northern Sector of screen detachments, while from 14 March, P.P. Torgushin and A.I. Kovrigin were the commissars and from 15 April, they were replaced by M.M. Lashevich and I.T. Smolga; Gen V.N. Yegoryev was appointed the military leader of the Western Sector of screen detachments established on 29 March with the commissars I.M. Arefyev and A.M. Pyzhev. Working as commissars for Gen K.K. Baiov who was the military leader of the Moscow Region were Lt M.N. Tukhachevskiy who at that time had just joined the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] and WO ["praporshchik"] Yu.V. Sablin from the Leftist SRs and who became a Bolshevik only in 1919. Consequently, initially the commissars (they were later called "political" or "military") were conceived of as a sort of inspector who monitored the activities of the military specialists. At the same time, this troika comprised the military council which was a collective military command body.

On 6 April, IZVESTIYA VTsIK published an explanation of the People's Commissar for Military Affairs and Chairman of the VVS L.D. Trotsky "On Military Commissars and Military Council Members." This began with the definition that "the military commissar is a direct political body of Soviet power in the army" and then it went on to speak about the personal inviolability of the commissars, their duty and obligations to sign the orders of the military leaders. Their other rights and duties were also explained, in particular, such as:

"The commissars link the Red Army facilities with the central and local facilities of Soviet power and ensure the assistance of the latter to the Red Army.

"The commissars make certain that all the Red Army workers from the top to the bottom carry out their job conscientiously and energetically, that money is spent thriftily and under strictest supervision and that the military property of the Soviet Republic be protected with all conscientiousness."

It is not difficult to note that the supervisory functions of the military commissars had been broadened. This document ends with an explanation of the procedure for appointing the commissars and with the announcement of the establishing of the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars and this was to unify their activities, respond to requests, work out essential instructions and in the event of necessity convene commissar congresses.

The first and only All-Russian Congress of Military Commissars was held in Moscow on 7-11 June. Participating in it were 365 men who were commissars from battalions, regiments, divisions and detachments as well as representatives of the local volost and up to the okrug military headquarters bodies. Among those present at the congress were 274 communists and the remainder were predominantly Leftist SRs. Let us give certain statements from the introductory speech by Trotsky at it:

"We are confronted with the task of establishing an army organized on the principle of comradely trust and labor revolutionary order. There is no doubt that this is an unusually major, complex and difficult undertaking....

"The duties of the military commissars include unceasing work in the interests of raising awareness in the masses of the army and mercilessly eradicating the undesirable element which has penetrated it.... If a commissar does not intervene in combat operations, this is only because he stands above any military leader, monitors his actions and supervises his every step. A commissar is a political leader, a revolutionary..."¹⁶

Let us turn our attention to a somewhat unusual (from the standpoint of social psychology) definition of the principle for organizing the Red Army and the formulation of the new duties (in comparison with the previous document) for the military commissar as a political leader ("raising the consciousness" of the soldiers and so forth).

The designated ideas (even including the specific wording) underlay the draft regulation on military commissariats and commissars and which was discussed at the congress and underwent a number of changes. Thus, according to the draft, a commissar was to be responsible "for all the work of his institution" (this removed responsibility from the military leaders) and in the final wording "for the reliability of the work of the military leaders and all the command personnel," and demands were increased on the military training of the commissars. Instead of "the military commissar should generally...know military affairs" there was "the military commissar is to study military affairs and participate in tactical exercises and war games along with the remaining command personnel of his unit."¹⁷

The regulation pointed to the necessity of carrying out the program of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs, the decrees and orders of Soviet power as well as to the personal duty of the commissars to direct cultural and educational activities. Consequently, the functions of the commissars were not restricted to supervising the

activities of the military specialists. Now they would be directly responsible for organizing political work in the army. This was particularly important in line with the forthcoming mobilizations as well as due to the incomprehension of many military specialists concerning the importance of the political education of servicemen.

The Bolshevik Party was the leader and organizer of political work in the Red Army from the very outset, regardless of the fact that among the military commissars initially there were representatives of the Leftist SRs, anarchists and even nonparty persons (particularly in the local military administrative bodies). The critics of Trotsky, and there were numerous such persons even during the period of the Civil War, endeavored to ascribe to him a disdainful attitude toward the commissars and subservience to the military specialists as well as excessive exactingness. We can say directly that he had more than enough disdain. But he always considered himself a commissar, a political worker and party leader and, in our view, this was correct. For confirmation of this idea, let us turn to his memoirs:

"Military affairs absorbed the main and ever-increasing part of my time, particularly as I myself had to begin from the very rudiments. In the technical and operational areas I saw my tasks primarily in placing the proper personnel in the proper place and letting them do their job. The political and organizational work in creating the army merged completely with the work of the party. Only in this manner could there be success."¹⁸

Iron Discipline and...Repressions

The very idea of Trotsky's about the necessity of iron discipline was not a new one in the armed forces and had been repeatedly voiced by the founders of Marxism. "Iron discipline," wrote Engels at the beginning of the 1850s, "...alone can ensure victory...."¹⁹ Even 18 months before this, Engels had pointed to the example of a rebel army and how great was the role of political awareness, pointing out that "the most decisive communists were the boldest soldiers." V.I. Lenin on 7 March 1918 emphasized that the war had taught the Russian people "to organize, to be disciplined, to obey and establish a discipline which was exemplary."²⁰ Lenin never had any doubts as to the existence of the new discipline and its conscious nature. The same was true of Trotsky. Here is how he formulated this in a speech on 22 March 1918:

"As for discipline in the army, it should be the discipline of people forged together by a united, firm revolutionary awareness, an awareness of one's socialist duty. This will not be discipline based upon commands from above, the discipline of the officer's stick but rather fraternal, aware, revolutionary discipline."²¹

Of course, there could be no question of the officer's stick. But Trotsky constantly made certain that orders from above were carried out. In assuming the post of the Narkomvoen, he immediately announced a planned reduction in the elective principle. On 21 March, a decision of the VVS was adopted and on 22 April, the

VTsIK Decree "On the Procedure for Changing Positions in the RKKA." In submitting the draft of the latter, Trotsky explained that when power had been in the hands of the exploiting classes hostile to the masses of soldiers, it was natural that the workers and peasants dressed in soldier greatcoats, in struggling for their political liberation, demanded the electing of military leaders. But under the new conditions, the question of elections and appointments assumed secondary significance. The questions of the appointing of both commanders and commissars now began to be resolved by Soviet power. There were also other arguments against elections, for example, the fact that the recently mobilized soldiers could not know for whom they should vote. Finally, being elected put the commander in a certain dependence upon the soldiers and this unconditionally would have a negative impact on order and discipline.

The struggle for discipline was accompanied by the search for various forms of restraining the servicemen from improper actions such as leaving service (desertion), the failure to execute orders, misconduct, cheating and so forth. In a number of places (Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals and so forth) the initiative arose of accepting a written obligation in joining the Red Army. The people's commissar responded positively to this.

On 22 April at a session of the VTsIK there was a discussion of the "formula of a solemn promise," or, in using today's language, the text of the military oath prepared by L.D. Trotsky. The SR Representative Ilin expressed doubt as to its benefit: "Don't think that the oath will be able to do anything." However, the text was approved by a majority of votes. On 10 May, the Moscow Garrison for the first time took a "socialist vow."

Initially a speech was given by the VTsIK Chairman, Ya.M. Sverdlov. Then the People's Commissar Trotsky explained the purpose of the oath. Then a strong chorus of Red Army voices repeated the text after the commanders. "You could feel," wrote IZVESTIYA VTsIK on 11 May, "that the words of the oath were pronounced not by mouths alone but proceeded from deep in the heart and a full awareness of their meaning."

The text of the "obligations" or "engagements" which were taken by the volunteers on the spot often contained a point about the length of service. The people's commissar promptly seized on this initiative as well. When on 22 April the decree was passed "On the Length of Service in the Red Army," Trotsky pointed out that this was necessitated by the extraordinary turnover in the army as there were many who, having volunteered for service, received their food, clothing and then left the army.

The decree established that each citizen joining the RKKA should serve at least 6 months in it. The person who arbitrarily left service before this period could be punished including up to depriving the right of citizenship in the Soviet Republic.

The system of disciplinary penalties had just begun to develop at that time. It had numerous opponents. Nevertheless, comrade courts became widespread and the Disciplinary Regulations were prepared. At the same time, in a number of documents of the Narkomvoen and texts of speeches by Trotsky of those times one can encounter the threat of "criminal liability" and at times "including execution." Such turns of phrase are also encountered in Lenin's works. But over time they become fewer and fewer and more and more frequently he emphasizes the significance of discipline which is "comradely," "devoted," "conscientious," "labor" although "strict." Virtually all these epithets are to be found, for example, in Lenin's speeches recorded on records at the end of March 1919 and in one of which he directly emphasized: "The Red Army has established unprecedentedly firm discipline but not by the rod but rather on the basis of awareness, dedication and self-sacrifice of the workers and peasants themselves."²²

For Trotsky the evolution of views occurred differently. Even in a talk with a co-worker from the Press Bureau published on 9 April in the *IZVESTIYA VTsIK*, the people's commissar noted a decline in the feeling of responsibility among the servicemen:

"A psychology has become established whereby it seems that an unexecuted order more or less is of no importance for the interests of the nation. A stop must be put to this. In the Soviet Army and in the Red Navy, discipline should be discipline, a soldier should be a soldier, a sailor a sailor and an order an order. The Red Armymen and Red Sailors are realizing this more and more clearly on the basis of the first experiment in chaotic democracy."

In the struggle against the vestiges of "chaotic democracy," cliquishness, and negligence, severe measures had to be applied. With the widening front of combat against the interventionists and internal counterrevolution and with the increased size of the army, the tasks of strengthening discipline became ever-harder to carry out. The frequent stays in the army in the field and direct encounters with instances of betrayal, cowardice and desertion could not help but harden Trotsky's character and contributed to the formation of his contradictory concept. Moreover, he was fond of few people and fondest of himself. Thus developed Trotsky's contradictory concept. On the one hand, "it is impossible to build an army without repressions. It is impossible to lead a mass of people to death without having the death penalty in the arsenal of the command. As long as the proud, evil tailless apes called men will organize an army and fight, the command will put the soldiers between possible death ahead and uncertain death behind."²³ And here he continued: "But the armies are not created out of fear. The Tsarist Army did not disintegrate out of a lack of repressions. In trying to save the army by restoring the death penalty, Kerenskiy merely finished it off. In the ashes of the Great War, the Bolsheviks have created a new army. For anyone who even a little understands the

language of history, these facts do not require explanation. The ideas of the October Revolution were the strongest cement of the new army."²⁴

Unfortunately, the press has either quoted only the first of these or, what is even worse, changed their places and removed the "but."

It must be pointed out that even in terms of the interventionists, Trotsky endeavored to make a distinction in separating those who were consciously fighting against Soviet power and those who were ready to voluntarily put down their arms. On 31 March 1918, in replying to the questions of the representative of the Czechoslovak Corps, Vjaceslav Neubert, he stated directly that he had issued orders for the immediate and unconditional disarming of all Czechoslovak echelons and for the executing of any Czechoslovak who did not voluntarily surrender his arms.

Trotsky employed the death penalty as one of the means of strengthening discipline in the Red Army even during his first trip to the front.

Of Course There Were Differences of Opinion

It is not difficult to imagine that this was a question of differences between Trotsky and Lenin. This phrase has been taken from Trotsky's memoirs. The author then goes on to note: "But immeasurably more often it happened that we reached the same conclusion having exchanged two words over the telephone or independently of one another."²⁵

In our view, there is no reason not to believe this. Particularly if one considers that this was a period when Lenin and Trotsky were working side by side.

Let us recall, for example, that the opinions of Lenin and Trotsky coincided in the course of the session of the VTsIK on 4 November 1917, when the question was being discussed of the press and the request of the Leftist SRs or the session of the SNK during the night of 21-22 February 1918, when they discussed the draft of the appeal decree "The Socialist Fatherland in Danger!" The Leftist SR I.Z. Shteynberg, according to Trotsky's memoirs, argued against their inclusion in the draft of the phrase about execution "at the site of the crime" for enemy agents or speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators and German spies. Lenin who participated in writing the decree insisted on keeping this phrase.²⁷ This occurred in February at the moment of the offensive by the Kaiser troops, but was described by Trotsky and published when all the witnesses were still alive and certainly would have contested this (particularly Stalin).

The most important difference of opinion arose over the question of the peace with Germany. Let us recall that on 8 January 1918, Lenin came out with the theses showing the necessity of concluding a peace. Of the 60 party workers present, around one-half favored a revolutionary war, around one-quarter favored Trotsky's line

(to declare the state of war over, demobilize the army, send the troops home, but don't sign a peace) and around one-quarter for peace. However, Lenin never declared Trotsky's viewpoint to be either absurd or particularly risible, as the bourgeois press has attempted to do.

Ultimately, Lenin was able to achieve the adopting of a decision on the concluding of a peace which was all the more necessary due to the start of the German offensive. At the Seventh Emergency Congress of the RKP(b) held on 6-8 March, he explained that "Trotsky's tactics, to the degree that this meant a delay, was correct; it became incorrect when the state of war was declared to be over but a peace was not signed."²⁸

And now on the case of the difference of opinion between Lenin and Trotsky over one of the major questions of military organizational development as can be seen from the documents signed by them. Initially, Lenin and Trotsky reached an unanimous opinion on the possible structure for the superior military leadership body: a military specialist with two military political commissars under him. Command was to be organized in the form of such a triangle in the troop units and formations (from the screens down to the brigades) and in the large structural subdivisions of the Narkomvoen itself.

On 31 March, the order of the VVS No. 23 appeared on the establishing of the military districts and on 8 April the SNK Decree on instituting the volost [county], uyezd, provincial and district commissariats for military affairs [voyenkomats]. In speaking about these local military administrative bodies at a session of the VTsIK on 22 April, Trotsky again emphasized that they would include three members of a collegium: one leader and two commissars. For this reason, the impression might be gained that the same triangle would be kept. However, this triangle had been rotated by 120 degrees.


Let us compare both documents. They were both drawn up by military specialists. But the draft decree underwent major changes before it reached the SNK session.

While in the order of the VVS signed by Trotsky, superior administrative power in the district was declared to be the military district council consisting of the military leader and two political commissars, according to the SNK decree signed by Lenin, such power was to be the district military commissariat consisting of two commissars for military affairs and one military leader.

While according to the VVS order for solving the questions of managing the district, a military district committee was to be organized under the chairmanship of a military leader, according to the SNK Decree for discussing such questions a permanent conference was to be organized under the chairmanship of the district military commissar.²⁹

Why had it been necessary to rotate the triangle, that is, put not the military leader at the head of the collegium of the local military command bodies, but rather one of the military commissars? Certainly this concerned not only the district military commissariats but also the provincial, uyezd and volost ones and was related not only to presiding at the conferences. The military commissar was subordinate to the superior commissar and reported to him; he (and not the military leader) was appointed the garrison chief in the provincial or uyezd center. In the activities of the local military bodies the main thing was the carrying out of the tasks of organizing the Red Army on the spot in close contact with the party organizations and the soviets. Along with administrative work they also had to conduct agitation for joining the RKKA and then conduct mobilizations, organize Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training], carry out a strict class principle of manning the units, and direct the use of the troops for the needs of the local soviets, for instance, in the fight for grain, against the local counterrevolution and so forth.³⁰

At the All-Russian Congress of Military Commissars on 7 June 1918, Trotsky in an introductory speech corrected himself. At the same time, he as before continued to consider the voyenkomats as only administrative bodies which he stated at the Fifth Congress of Soviets.



How the Triangle War Turned

Lenin, as is known, had extremely high regard for the activities of the voyenkomats during the years of the Civil War. "We have an enormous military apparatus. Without the military commissar we would not have had a Red Army,"³¹ he said in one of his speeches of that time.

It would be incorrect not to point out that the appointment of the military commissars by the leaders of the local military command bodies provided the prerequisites for the pending—even from 1919—transition to one-man command in them. For the sake of justice, it must be remembered that in the VVS even in March Trotsky replaced a military specialist in the post of chairman. Incidentally, in the Narkomvoyo he became the only people's commissar. Although we must give one's due, the orders and decrees of both bodies in the period examined by us were signed by Trotsky, as a rule, not alone but with one of the members of the Narkomvoyo Collegium or the VVS members.

It is not our task to describe the differences of opinion between Trotsky and Lenin in the subsequent period. These intensified and a great deal has been written about this, in wrongly ascribing to Trotsky a departure from the party line, a desire to escape from under the supervision of the RKP(b) Central Committee and so forth. This has been soundly repudiated in the mentioned article of Yu.I. Korablev. Lenin never denied the existing differences. He spoke about this, in particular, at the Full Session of the Eighth Party Congress as well as at a closed session of the military section: "We have had our differences of opinion and mistakes—no one would deny this.... We are all humans...and no one should draw from this the conclusion that the Central Committee policy is not being carried out in the military department."³²

"Of course, there were differences of opinion....," said Trotsky, echoing Lenin. And at the same time he admitted:

"I was too clearly aware of what Lenin meant for the revolution, for history and for myself personally. He was my teacher. But this does not mean that I aped his words and gestures. But I learned from him to reach independently those same decisions which he did."³³

EPILOG

We have been able to describe only certain areas in the activities of People's Commissar Trotsky in these 4 months, in our view, the most important areas related to carrying out the tasks of organizing the Red Army.

The Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 10 July 1918 adopted a special decree on the organizing of the Red Army. It actually approved all the measures of the Narkomvoyo and reinforced the course of building up mass regular Armed Forces capable of defending the Soviet Republic under the conditions of the commenced Civil War and widening intervention. A major contribution to the elaboration and implementation of this

course was made by L.D. Trotsky (this requires further fundamental research.—M.M.). Lenin had high praise for this contribution.

A.M. Gorkiy described how he was amazed by Lenin's high praise for the organizational abilities of Trotsky. Lenin had replied:

"Yes, yes, I know! Someone is lying about my attitude toward him. It seems that they lie a great deal about me and about Trotsky."

Striking his hand on the table, he said:

"But let them point to another person who had been capable in almost a year to organize an almost exemplary army and even win the respect of the military specialists. We have such a person. We have everything! And there will be miracles."

In quoting this text dating to 1923, Yu.I. Korablev has compared it with the one which appeared in 1931 and which later was incorporated in the other editions of memoirs about Lenin. The last part was almost completely discarded and replaced with the words:

"But still he is not one of us! He is with us, but not ours. There is ambition. In him there is something...not good, from Lassal."³⁴

It is no secret that Trotsky had more than enough flaws. He was profoundly convinced of his own geniality and in the heat of his own self-esteem, frankly deplored others. Lenin and the party Central Committee had repeatedly pointed out his errors to him and to the need for a more attentive attitude toward comrades, and Lenin's legacy spoke of his excessive self-confidence and excessive infatuation "with the purely administrative aspect of the question." Nevertheless, Lenin commented: "Personally he is certainly the most capable man in the current Central Committee...."³⁵

In conclusion, let us point out that in November 1919, the Central Committee Politburo ruled to submit Trotsky for the awarding of the Order of the Red Banner. This award was given.

Footnotes

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 7, p 519.
2. "Leninskiy sbornik" [Leninist Collection], Moscow, Partizdat, Vol XXI, 1933, p 91.
3. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 1, inv. 2, file 144, sheets 49-50.
4. See: A.G. Kavtaradze, "Voyennyye spetsialisty na sluzhbe Respubliki Sovetov 1917-1920 gg." [Military Specialists in the Service of the Soviet Republic 1917-1920], Moscow, Nauka, 1988, p 77.
5. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 137.

6. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 196, sheet 204.

7. There certainly were a number of errata in the press. However, at the Leningrad Party Archives we were able to become acquainted with the minutes of a session of the City Conference of Representatives of Red Army Units on 29 March 1918, where in Zinovyev's presence, the following words were recorded: "The army needs officers. The officers have lost respect, they are counter-revolutionaries and stupid, but out of 100 you can find 5 who are more decent and we can use them in our work under our strictest control" (Leningrad Party Archives, folio 1, inv. 1, file 80, sheet 2).

8. "Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. Kratkaya biografiya" [Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. A Brief Biography], compiled by G.F. Aleksandrov, M.R. Galktionov, V.S. Kruzhkov, M.V. Mitin, V.D. Molchalov, P.N. Pospelov, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 2d Edition, 1947, pp 72-73.

9. K.Ye. Voroshilov was a member of the "military opposition" at the Eighth RKP(b) Congress. In 1928, he related that at this congress "the party portion of the leadership of the then fighting operational Red Army was against the so-called recruitment of specialists.... We protested strongly against this and struggled. At that time, Comrade Stalin thought the same as I did and shared this 100 percent" ("Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily. Voprosy i otvety" [Soviet Armed Forces. Questions and Answers], Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, p 61).

In Stalin's speeches at the congress, nothing was said about military specialists.

10. L. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn" [My Life], Berlin, Part II, p 173.

11. Ibid., p 174.

12. M.M. Lashevich was a Bolshevik from 1901, a junior officer, a member of the VTsIK Presidium, 2d Sitting and the Petrograd buro of the RKP(b) Central Committee. In the summer of 1918, he was a member of the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] and then commander of the 3d Army; in March 1919, he was a member of the Eastern Front RVS.

13. L. Trotsky, op. cit., p 180.

14. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 55.

15. PRAVDA, 24 March 1918.

16. TsGASA, folio 8, inv. 1, file 390, sheets 11-13 verso.

17. See: V.M. Mikhaleva, "The All-Russian Congress of Military Commissars," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 8, 1986, p 174.

18. L. Trotsky, op. cit., p 83.

19. K. Marks and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 27, p 315.

20. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 23.

21. L. Trotsky, "Kak vooruzhalas revolyutsiya" [How the Revolution Armed Itself], Vol 1, p 100.

22. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 240.

23. L. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn," Part II, p 141.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p 79.

26. See: V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, pp 53, 59.

27. L.D. Trotsky, "O Lenine" [On Lenin], p 74; "V.I. Lenin. Biokhronika" [V.I. Lenin. Biographic Chronicle], Vol 5, p 269.

28. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 30.

29. "Organizatsiya Krasnoy Armii: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov" [The Organization of the Red Army: Collection of Documents and Materials], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1943, p 101; "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of Soviet Power], Vol II, p 68.

At the designated SNK Session on 8 April, present from the war department in addition to L.D. Trotsky were N.I. Podvoyskiy and E.M. Sklyanskiy. This can serve as proof of their participation in correcting the draft (along with certain working documents kept at the TsGASA.—M.M.).

30. It was no accident that the VVS Order No. 23 caused a negative response on the spot. The Commissariat of the Petrograd Labor Commune in its letter recognized "the unconditional impossibility of turning over military power and military command to the district councils and committees which would be headed by military technicians at best indifferent to Soviet power." The letter was signed by V.N. Vasilevskiy, K.S. Yeremeyev, V.P. Pozern and others (TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 196, sheet 27).

31. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 41, p 148.

32. "Leninskiy sbornik," Moscow, Politizdat, Vol XXXVII, 1970, p 136.

33. L. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn," Part II, p 135.

34. POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE, No 2, 1989, p 61.

35. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 45, p 345.

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"It Is Impossible to Build an Army Without Repression..." L. Trotsky

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[Article prepared by Col A.Ya. Ponomarev: "'It Is Impossible to Build an Army Without Repression...' L. Trotsky"; conclusion, for previous installment see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1989]

[Text] The year was 1918. The nation was running short of food, fuel and cold and hunger covered all areas of the nation. Both in Soviet Russia as well as outside it and in various political circles many felt that Lenin and his government were doomed. Certain observers even assumed that Trotsky and the Leftist Opposition were on the threshold of power.¹

In heading the Council of People's Commissars [SNK] and the Council of Worker and Peasant Defense and relying on the broad masses of the people, Lenin at this time was carrying out the very complex tasks of building a new Soviet state and its Armed Forces. And for him there were no minor or secondary questions. On 4 April 1922, V.I. Lenin wrote to the chairman of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council [RVSR]:

"Top Secret.

"Comrade Trotsky.

"Yesterday I learned by accident but from a source close to the matter and worthy of absolute trust that the cadets in the courses in the Kremlin², in the first place, are going hungry and secondly all are dissatisfied with the extremely harsh patrols which do not allow them to study.

"On this question should we not:

"1. Introduce in the SNK a petition to allocate an additional amount specifically to improve the diet of the Kremlin cadets to complete satiety.

"2. Discuss whether it is not possible to reduce the patrols of the Kremlin cadets by introducing an electric warning system in the Kremlin (an engineer, Zhernan, has showed us his experiments in the Kremlin: such a warning system where a bell rings when someone comes close to a wire even before touching it).

"3. To discuss whether or not an electric warning system is not capable of reducing the number and times of patrols as well as employ other equipment in a number of closed guard boxes from which everything can be seen but in which the sentry is not visible or some other system for checking passes and so forth.

"Your Lenin,"³

The recently published articles about Trotsky have emphasized his energy, talent as an organizer and importance in the organizational development of the Armed Forces; they have pointed out his accomplishments during the period of his work as the head of the peace delegation to Brest and the starting point of the authors' arguments again is the praise given by V.I. Lenin to Trotsky. Let us endeavor to understand what was happening then.

On 11 (24) January 1918, there was a Central Committee session at which they discussed the question of war and peace. Lenin spoke. Against his position were the "leftist

communists" and Trotsky. Trotsky's proposal of "neither peace nor war" was supported by Bukharin, Uritskiy, Lomov (Oppokov) and others (a total of 10 persons against 7). In hoping to overcome the resistance to concluding a peace within the Central Committee, Lenin made a proposal adopted by a majority (12 in favor and 1 against) on the drawing out of the talks in any possible way. At precisely that moment, V.I. Lenin commented that "Trotsky initially made magnificent use of the talks for agitation and correctly carried out a tactic of drawing them out...(PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 30). But the situation had changed. Russia needed peace. However, on 28 January (10 February) 1918, contrary to the directives of V.I. Lenin to sign a peace in the event that the German side issued an ultimatum for this, L.D. Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk declared that the Soviet government refused to sign a peace treaty...it considered the war over and was demobilizing the army. Moreover, without informing the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the SNK, he sent to Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC], in essence, a provocative telegram with instructions to issue during the night of 29 January (11 February) an order to halt the state of war with Germany and its allies and demobilize the Russian Army. Trotsky's instructions were carried out. Early in the morning of 29 January (11 February), the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, N.V. Krylenko, issued such an order. V.I. Lenin corrected this "error" by Trotsky.

After the ratification of the Brest Peace Treaty by the Fifth Congress of Soviets, Trotsky retired from the post of people's commissar for foreign affairs. (In July 1919, now as chairman of the RVSR and the people's commissar for military and naval affairs, he again submitted a similar request due to differences over military strategic questions.) His request was not accepted and then he decided not to appear in official institutions....

But in those disquieted times, Trotsky's train, his speeches and figure were known far beyond Russia. In the nations of Europe and in the United States the successes of the Red Army were ascribed exclusively to the talent and "leadership of Trotsky."

Here in front of us is a collection published in 1987 and entitled "V.I. Lenin. Voyennaya perepiska. 1917-1922 gg." [V.I. Lenin. Military Correspondence. 1917-1922] with 57 documents⁴ sent to L.D. Trotsky and 47 to Stalin.⁵ The content of the letters, notes and other documents sent to People's Commissar Trotsky makes it possible to give him a far from brilliant qualification as a military leader. The documents show that, in the first place, namely V.I. Lenin and no one else directed the defense of the Soviet state and the founding of the Red Army and, secondly, that in systematically receiving the official military-political and military information and being excellently informed on the state of affairs on the

fronts, in the armies and the individual sectors, V.I. Lenin provided great aid to the RVSR directing the work of its chairman.

Thirdly, they show that L.D. Trotsky, regardless of his authorship of a number of important party decrees and directives of Soviet power on the Red Army (as is asserted in certain recent articles), was basically only an extremely harsh military administrator. A careful and thoughtful reading of each of Lenin's letters to Trotsky on military affairs shows that a larger portion of them (around 75 percent) is made up of materials of a directive nature, such as instructions, orders, advice and demands from Lenin, the Central Committee and the Politburo, including letters (approximately 25 percent) in which the chairman of the Defense Council (from April 1920, the Labor and Defense Council) of the Republic expresses disagreement with various decisions of the Chairman of the RVSR Trotsky and his indignation over Trotsky's attitude toward military affairs.

Trotsky's talent as a military strategist can also be seen in examining certain of his orders to the troops (fronts).

Readers have shown great doubts and valid questions concerning many disputed aspects in the recent publications about L.D. Trotsky. "We would be very grateful if they (the authors of the articles.—A.P.) could reach a common opinion and conclusions, for example, on the question of who proposed and defended the correct plan for the counteroffensive against Denikin—Trotsky or Stalin," writes the Senior Instructor on the Chair of Marxism-Leninism and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col Yu.V. Gelvides (Krasnodar).

We feel that an answer to this question will be provided to the readers in the document published below:

"Via the operations department of the operations directorate

"Telegram

"To Chairman of RVSR, Comrade Trotsky

"Copy to Staff of Southern Front Lashevich⁶

"Moscow '6' September

"To No. 364. First. I am not against the immediate appointment of Selivachev as commander of the Southern Front. Second. The transfer of Assistant Commander of the Southern Front Yegorov to Selivachev's place I consider undesirable for the following reasons....

"Third. Moving now toward Lashevich from Penza are the Urals Rifle Reserve Battalion with 450 bayonets, the Penza Special Battalion with 500 bayonets, the 1st Rifle Regiment with 400 bayonets and 3 guns, a guard company of internationalists with 119 bayonets and a battery of Red Officers from the Eastern Front....

"4th and 5th (emphasis mine.—A.P.).

"The change proposed by you in the direction of the 9th Army to the west and the transfer to the right center, that is, as I understand you, to the Kursk-Voronezh sector of the Budennyi corps is a fundamental change in the plan adopted and steadily being carried out to fight against Denikin. This plan was based on the concentrating of sufficiently large forces on the left flank of the Southern Front and the launching by them of a final strike against the Don and Kuban as the sources of Denikin's personnel. Precisely the Don and Kuban gave Denikin the main portion of his forces and all Denikin's remaining troops are few in number and do not have solid sources of supply. Our strike on the Kursk-Voronezh sector would be only an auxiliary operation aimed at holding up the exploitation of enemy success on the Kursk axis and, having tied down the enemy forces, would prevent it from moving them to the east to oppose our main thrust. These goals are being achieved regardless of the hitch in the development of the designated operation and such a hitch is of no essential significance for carrying out the overall plan. The Kursk-Voronezh sector has not been the main one previously and is not becoming such now and I completely cannot agree with the fact that the center of struggle of the entire Southern Front has now been shifted to it.

"The abandonment now of the established and largely executed plan for combating Denikin and the shifting of the center of gravity from our left flank to the Kursk-Voronezh sector would lead to the abandonment of the initiative which has just been seized from the hands of the enemy and to the subordination of our actions to the desires of the enemy. (Emphasis mine.—A.P.) Actually the fighting on the Kursk-Voronezh sector would be advantageous precisely for the enemy, as it has there both a concentration of forces and a broadly developed network of routes for quickly concentrating troops from the Ukraine and from other Western areas while the concentration of forces for checking our blow on the eastern part of the front would be difficult for the enemy due to the distances and the lack of communications. Moreover, the shifting of forces from the eastern part of the Southern Front to the Kursk-Voronezh sector would lead us, probably, to going over from the offensive to the defensive along the entire front since as neither there nor here do we have sufficient forces for exploiting the attack. I consider the going over to the defensive now completely lethal. For these reasons I consider it essential to hold firmly to the adopted plan of actions and simultaneously with this telegram I am confirming it with the commander of the Southern Front, forbidding him to change the direction of the 9th Army to the west and the weakening of forces in the eastern part of the front. In particular, about Mamontov's breakthrough to his own troops on the Kursk-Voronezh sector I assume that such a thing is completely probable but feel that for us this will be less painful and dangerous than other possible directions of Mamontov's movement, for example, toward Uryupinsk where he, of course, must not be allowed under any circumstances and for which I will take the most decisive measures if such a direction is

determined for Mamontov. Sixthly. Measures have been taken to replenish and supply the 8th and 13th Armies.

"No. 4195/inv.

"Commander-in-Chief (signature) S. Kamenev

"Member of RVSR (signature) S. Gusev

"Chief of Staff of RVSR (signature) Lebedev."⁷

On the same date, 6 September 1919, having expressed his amazement, Lenin signed and sent a telegram to Trotsky:

"To Trotsky

"To Serebryakov⁸

"To Lashevich

"The Central Committee Politburo, having discussed the telegram from Trotsky, Serebryakov and Lashevich, has confirmed the reply of the commander-in-chief and expresses its amazement over the attempts to revise the accepted main strategic plan.

"Upon authorization of the Central Committee Politburo

"Written 6 September 1919

"Sent to Orel

"Lenin"⁹

...The Southern Front. What was Trotsky's role in its successes and failures? This is best described in the following document (a telegram to the RKP(b) Central Committee and its copy to the RVSR S.I. Gusev sent on 16 August 1919):

"Copy. Moscow. RVSR. To Gusev."¹¹

"I have become convinced that the commander of the Southern Front is not handling his job. I am also convinced that the presence of Sokolonikov and Trotsky have not brought anything to the Southern Front except death. Their work contradicts the most fundamental provisions of military affairs. The cumbersome RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] and the allocating of jobs between the individual members lead to complete decentralization in the area of troop command and control and this, in turn, leads to complete collapse and loss. I have no opportunity to influence the Southern Front and even my own armies with the current make-up of the front. **The only way out of the situation is to recall Trotsky and Sokolonikov and organize a normal RVS of the front** (emphasis mine.—A.P.) consisting of myself, Lashevich and a good military specialist eliminating the workers from the east. The situation on the left flank is growing stronger with every hour. There is no doubt that the operation will be conducted successfully. Give me a reply immediately.

"No. 19 Smilga"¹²

"18/18. 1050 hours. Deciphered and original of enciphered message burned up.

"Signature (Portnov)

"Verified:

"Secretary of the Commissar of the RVSR Field Staff

"M. Burakov"

In endeavoring to "extinguish" the conflicts and achieve close work of the command, Vladimir Ilich [Lenin] replied to this telegram of I.T. Smilga: "I have sent you a letter and later received yours of the 16th. Trotsky is here and will seemingly spend a week. I hope you can establish close work with him...."¹³

For the same purpose, Lenin sent letters and telegrams of similar content to Trotsky. In a telegram (to Trotsky) of 23 October 1918, Vladimir Ilich wrote: "Stalin came today and brought news of three major victories of our troops at Tsaritsyn.... In informing you, Lev Davydovich, of all these statements by Stalin¹⁴, I would like you to think them over and answer, in the first place, whether you agree to have a talk personally with Stalin and he is ready to come for this and, secondly, do you consider it possible, under the known specific conditions, to eliminate the former friction and establish joint work **which Stalin so desires** (emphasis mine.—A.P.).

"As for me, I propose that every effort must be made to organize joint work with Stalin...."¹⁵

Trotsky's high opinion of himself often tripped him up. Much later, now as an emigre, he wrote in "Moya zhizn" [My Life]: "I arrived in Russia in February 1905. The other emigre leaders returned only in October and November. Among the Russian comrades there was not a single one from whom I could learn something. On the contrary, I myself had to assume the role of teacher.... I organically felt that the years as a student were over.... In following years I studied now as a master and not as a student.... With all responsibility I state that in analyzing the political situation as a whole and its revolutionary prospects, I cannot accuse myself of any major errors of judgment."¹⁶

In this sense there is the curious story of the removal of S.S. Kamenev from the position as the commander of the Eastern Front. This began with the order from Trotsky: "The armies of the Eastern Front for 8 months have been led by S.S. Kamenev. Under his command the armies have launched a number of attacks against the Czechoslovaks, the Dutov and Kolchak bands. Under the leadership of Comrade Kamenev, the Eastern Front has recovered Ufa, Orenburg and Uralsk for the Soviet Republic.

"As a consequence of a number of factors, our Eastern Front has temporarily weakened and Kolchak has recaptured Ufa, having pushed our troops back a significant distance.¹⁷ However, in recent weeks the Eastern Front under the leadership of Commander Kamenev has initiated energetic measures to restore the situation. These

measures have already led to the first major successes. On a larger portion of the line of the Eastern Front our armies have gone over to a successful offensive. The intense and continuous work by the commander of the Eastern Front has necessitated a temporary respite. In granting Comrade Kamenev a 6-week leave and expressing gratitude to him on behalf of the Red Army, I am firmly hopeful that the Eastern Front under the leadership of the new commander A.A. Samoylov will exploit¹⁸ the already gained successes and will provide the Soviet Republic with a complete victory over Kolchak."¹⁹

The relations between Trotsky and the Eastern Front RVS were also negatively influenced by a mistaken directive from the Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis (supported by Trotsky) on the going over of the front to a defensive on the line of the Kama and Belaya Rivers and the withdrawing from it of several divisions for the Southern Front. This was mentioned above.

The conflict between Trotsky and the Eastern Front RVS was intensified due to the disagreement of the members of the front's RVS with Trotsky's work methods. In October 1918, Trotsky dispatched two telegrams to the 3d Army RVS and one of the telegrams had the following content: "Around 2 weeks ago several officers deserted from the Perm Division. I demanded the drawing up of service records giving the residence of their families for the immediate arrest of the same, but I received no reply. Equally I demanded a reply to whether you had executed the commissars of the divisions and regiments who permitted the betrayal by the command personnel (emphasis mine.—A.P.). No answer was replied. I demand an immediate explanation of all points.

"18th. No. 598.

"Chairman of RVSr Trotsky."²⁰

Smilga and Lashevich replied to Trotsky in a report where they said: "We would have to execute, among others, Bakayev (4th Division—Commander Blyukher) and Zalutskiy (5th Division—Commander Damber, associate of Blyukher). This we cannot do for we do not consider them guilty...."²¹ Simultaneously with the report for the Chairman of the RVSr, they sent a statement to the RKP(b) Central Committee in which they said literally the following about the commissars: "We categorically protest against the extremely flippant attitude of Comrade Trotsky to such things as execution. He, having learned that in a certain regiment several officers had deserted, his demanding the execution of the regiment and division commissars. In accurately following the sense of the telegram, we should have executed, among others, Bakayev and Zalutskiy. Of course, we did not do this.... We have not had a single division in which there has not been instances of betrayal. We would have to execute half of the RVS for the Commander of the 3d Army Bogoslavskiy, who at one time was appointed by the RVS, has fled without assuming command...."²²

The RKP(b) Central Committee took the appropriate measures, but Trotsky did not change his "methods of troop leadership," and the unjustified executions continued until the end of the Civil War.

"Order"²³

"Of the Chairman of the RVSr to the Expeditionary Forces

"Boguchar

No. 100

25 May 1919

"To be read in all companies, squadrons, batteries and crews.

"An end to the foul Don revolt!

"The last hour has come!

"All the necessary preparations have been made. Sufficient forces have been assembled to deal with the traitors. The hour has come of settling scores with the Cains who for more than 2 months have struck in the back of our operational armies of the Southern Front. All worker-peasant Russia with revulsion and hate looks at those Migulin, Veshen, Yelan and Shumilin bands who, having raised a false red flag, are helping the Black Hundred landowners: Denikin and Kolchak.

"Soldiers, commanders and commissars of the punitive troops!

"The preparatory work is over. All the necessary forces have been concentrated. Your ranks are drawn up. Now according to the signal: Forward!

"The nests of the dishonest traitors should be cleared out. The Cains should be exterminated. There must be no mercy for the villages which put up resistance. Mercy only for those who voluntarily surrender their weapons and come over to our side. Lead, steel and fire against the landowners Kolchak and Denikin!

"Soviet Russia is counting on you, comrade soldiers. In several days you will purge the Don of the black spot of betrayal. The last hour has come!

"Everyone to a man—forward!

"Chairman of the RVSr and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs

"L. Trotsky."

"Order"²⁴

"Of the Chairman of the RVSr No. 107

"6 June 1919

Balakleya Station

"A group of individuals around the partisan Makhno has set out on the path of the traitor Grigoryev and has begun to organize a conspiracy against Soviet power. This band from Gulyay-Pole has been so bold as to set

for 15 June a congress of anarchist-kulak delegates to fight against the Red Army and Soviet power.

"This congress has been prohibited. I state that any participant of the congress will be viewed as a traitor who is organizing a conspiracy in the immediate rear of our Red troops and opening the gates to the enemy.

"The Makhno followers are calling for deserters from other units and armies.

"I declare:

"To all military authorities and blocking detachments sent out on my orders, an order has been given to capture all those traitors who abandon their units spontaneously, desert to Makhno and they are to be turned over to the revolutionary tribunal as deserters for judgment under wartime laws.

"Their punishment can be only one—execution!

"The All-Russian Central Executive Committee [VTsIK] of Russia and the Ukraine have ordered me to introduce order on the front in the Donets Basin and the immediate rear. I declare that this order will be introduced with an iron hand. The enemies of the worker and peasant Red Army, the self-servers, kulaks, the supporters of thugs, the Makhno and Grigoryev bands will be mercilessly suppressed by the regular steadfast, reliable units, if they even dare to put up the slightest resistance.

"Long live revolutionary order, discipline and the struggle against the enemies of the people!

"Long live Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Russia!

"Chairman of the RVSR

"People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs L. Trotsky."

"Order²⁵

"Of the Chairman of the RVSR for the 7th Army

"No. 163

"Petrograd

2 November 1919

"A predominant majority of the 7th Army commanders is honorably carrying out their duty to Soviet Russia. But a certain number of traitors and agents of Yudenich have shown up in inferior command positions. These hirelings of foreign capital in individual instances have caused confusion and alarm, they have spread panic in their units and, taking advantage of this, have fled to the White camp, turning over a portion of the Red Armymen to their hands.

"I order the commanders and commissars to keep constant watch so that none of these cases of betrayal go unpunished.

"The families of the traitors should be immediately arrested.

"The traitors themselves are to be entered into the army's Black Book so that after the near and final triumph of the revolution none of these traitors will escape punishment.

"In a combat situation the commanders, commissars and progressive Red Armymen should vigilantly watch so as to prevent the traitors from carrying out their work and it is essential to execute on the spot anyone who endeavors to spread panic or calls for the throwing down of arms and deserting to the White camp.

"The exhausted enemy is resorting to bribery and provocation. In response to this, we must double our vigilance and mercilessness against the traitors and provocateurs!

"Chairman of the RVSR,
People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs,
L. Trotsky."

"In the Fight Against Desertion!"

"Order²⁶

"Of the Chairman of the RVSR and People's Commissar of Railroads for Gomel Province

"10 May 1920, Gomel

"No. 215

"At the very time that the Polish nobility was threatening to capture Gomel Province, within this province there is a large number of persons who refuse to report promptly for military service as well as direct deserters.

"The Polish pans want to take the land away from the peasants and return it to the landowners, give the plants back to the capitalists and subordinate the workers to the rich and the priests.

"A deserter from the ranks of the Red Army is a direct assistant of the Polish pans. Persons hiding out and deserters inside the Soviet nation and the Red Army are aiding the foreign pan invasion.

"The Hour Has Come for Severe Retribution Against the Deserters in Gomel Province!"

"I order the field and rear military authorities with the assistance of the railroad and generally the civilian authorities, to commence a decisive struggle against desertion.

"I. To declare to the uyezd, volost and rural soviet bodies (revolutionary committees) that they, and particularly their chairmen, are directly and immediately responsible for the struggle against desertion. The volost revolutionary committees which do not take measures

against cowards, traitors and agents of the Polish nobility should be subjected to arrest and remanded to the tribunal.

"2. Families which shelter deserters are to be subjected to property punishments regardless of remanding to a tribunal (confiscation of horses and other livestock and so forth).

"3. Organize traveling sessions of tribunals in all uyezds, charging the tribunal with the duty to deal mercilessly with the evil deserters on the spot.

"If the pans are victorious, hundreds of thousands of the best workers and peasants will be executed and hung. Slavery and tyranny will reign throughout Russia.

"Listen, peasants and workers!

"A fatal danger threatens your worker-peasant republic!

"The person who betrays the workers in the hour of danger will find no mercy!

"Death to deserters and traitors!

"Chairman of the RVSR and
People's Commissar of the Railroads
L. Trotsky."

"Order"²⁷

"Of the Chairman of the RVSR No. 227

"Moscow

13 June 1920

"Published here for public information is a sentence on a case of rear-services criminals who undermined the supply of the operational Red Army: The Moscow Extraordinary Commission [MChK] in combating counterrevolution, speculation and official crimes has reviewed the cases of criminals who by their actions have destroyed the plan for the correct supply of the Red Army.

"The criminal gang consisting of co-workers from the 2d Main Military Clothing Dump and including: the store supervisor Ivan Ivanovich Karyagin, the dump book-keeper Ivan Nikolayevich Arzhannikov and the artel members Petr Ivanovich Voronov and Mikhail Vasilyevich Parshutin, systematically stole from the dump department at Boynya Station, Ring Railroad, manufactured goods assigned for the clothing of the Red Army and supplied this to the speculative market. The criminals caught with the goods have confessed.

"The chief of the food depot, former quartermaster V.P. Lisovskiy and his assistants: the Guards A.Ye. Panfilov and P.I. Kopylov as well as the investigator from the UTChK [Cheka unit] at Likhobory Station, Circle Railroad, S.P. Novikov, maliciously sabotaged the cause of food supply for the Red Army, allowing food products such as salt, meat, sugar, molasses and so forth which had been dropped in the mud and scattered over the

ground at the Bratsevska Food Depots, sold and stole an enormous quantity of them instead of delivering them to the front.

"According to the Decree of the MChK Collegium of 10 June 1920, I.I. Karyagin, I.N. Arzhannikov, P.I. Voronov, M.V. Parshutin and V.P. Lisovskiy have been executed.

"A.Ye. Panfilov has been sentenced to 15 years while P.I. Kopylov and S.P. Novikov have been sentenced to a 10-year term in a concentration camp with loss of freedom and employment in punitive jobs."

"The defense of the victories of the revolutions necessitates the employment of the most repressive measures for the final victory over the internal and external counterrevolution and for this reason the MChK again cautions that any crime directed against national defense will be dealt with mercilessly.

"Chairman of the RVSR, Trotsky."

"By Direct Wire.

"Kharkov. To Commissar of OPS [food supply department] Drangovskiy. Copy to Comrade Rakovskiy. I am forwarding a draft order for approval by Comrade Rakovskiy. His signature would be desirable. I am not against corrections in the draft order.

"ORDER FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT AND PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF RAILROADS"²⁸

"No. 247

"Kharkov

14 October 1920

"While a majority of the Ukrainian railroad workers is honestly carrying out its duty to the labor republic and is aiding the Red Army in its fight against the last enemy, Baron Wrangel, a counterrevolutionary minority of railroad workers using all measures is assisting the enemies of the working class: Wrangel, Petlyura and the numerous Ukrainian bandits.

"The extermination of the bands is an essential condition for the existence, development and economic ascent of the Ukrainian Republic. This task would have been resolved long ago if the bandits did not have their agents among the railroad workers and who contacted one another, warned of danger, indicated military freight and helped destroy the railroad embankment and blow up bridges.

"At present, when a majority of the Ukrainian peasant population has rallied to the banner of Soviet power against the kulaks and bandits, the time has come to clear the railroads of the Petlyura agents.

"For this I order:

"1. All undependable railroad areas are to be taken under the command of the railroad troop unit.

"2. All railroad workers who are caught in direct or indirect assistance to the bandits, of failing to take measures to secure railroad property or of failing to warn neighboring stations and security bodies are to be punished in equal basis with the bandits according to the wartime laws.

"3. Those railway workers who, not committing direct crimes, yet marked by lack of discipline or inattentive to the requirements of the Red Army and showing a neglectful attitude toward the duties and public property are to be transferred from the Ukrainian railroads to the Murmansk and Northern Railroads and to the railroads of the Urals and Siberia, in being replaced by disciplined and conscientious transport workers.

"4. All bodies and institutions of the Railroads and the War Department are obliged to work hand in hand with the local soviet, professional and party organizations in combating the destroyers of transport among the railroad workers themselves.

"The ulcer of treason should be cauterized with a hot iron.

"Chairman of the RVSR and
Acting People's Commissar of Railroads,
L. Trotsky

"Chairman of the Ukrainian SNK

"Kh. Rakovskiy

"14 October 1920, No. 829."

Trotsky, in carrying out the duties of the RVSR chairman, loved to visit the front, employing strong-arm methods of leadership and giving passionate speeches at meetings.

Here is how in the article "Sad Recollections,"²⁹ published in October 1918 (on the day of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution) S.A. Auslander³⁰ describes one of the speeches of L.D. Trotsky.

"Trotsky

"...In the window of the offices of IZVESTIYA on Tverskaya Street (the former offices of RUSSKOYE SLOVO), next to the portraits of Marks and Lenin stood an enormous, excellently-done portrait of a man with jet-black hair and a narrow beard a la devil, with poetically tossed curls, arched brows, a hooked nose and impudent, disdainful lips. An old woman in a warm, torn dress with tearful eyes looked at the satanic figure, crossed herself and spat: 'Psaw, psaw, accursed man, the last anti-Christ times have come, and instead of an icon they show us some filth....'

"She did not know, probably, who this unknown insolent fellow was but she did know something, she understood something which we scholars and wise persons did not know....

"In a stifling June dusk I was hanging on the step of a streetcar, going to a meeting at Sokolniki.

"In the streetcar they were pushing angrily, and each was ready to shove the other out of the way, swearing, they sighed and whined while the newsboys shouted piercingly: 'Sixteen death sentences by the tribunal!'

"Your head spun from the heat and closeness and then there was the weakness, the hungry eternal weakness of slowly fading away.

"You no longer felt like thinking or arguing. Nothing made any difference.

"In a low smoke-filled hall it was close, intolerably close, the lights burned dimly, while drunken, impudent and cautious fellows in service jackets brandished their weapons, cocked them, swore, laughed and shouted: 'Right.'

"But the public had gray, sweaty, fatigued and angry faces.

"The local commissars spoke trying to convince, trying to appeal, but the crowd stirred gloomily and sullenly. They constantly interrupted the speakers.

"Give us bread. Our children are dying of hunger. We have heard enough of you.'

"The Red Armymen looked at the protesters threateningly and provocatively, and convulsively squeezed their revolvers.

"The cool did not float into the open windows, heavy, low storm clouds hung in the sky and distant summer lightning cut the dark heavens.

"Everything was tense, everything seemed to the breaking point. It felt as though the hungry anger would snap and merciless ferocity would be unleashed against these evil deceivers who had given only hunger, death and violence.

"It seemed that all these commissars who themselves paled with fear when confronted with this crushed, exhausted crowd could hold them no more, they could not stop these deceived persons black with fatigue and at the point of desperation and who would seek cruel revenge for the deception, for the months of gloom.

"The Red Armymen looked less impudent and pressed their rifles more cowardly.

"And into this fever-pitch atmosphere came Lev Trotsky-Bronshteyn.

"He appeared somehow theatrically, unexpectedly, as if popping up from a trap door.³¹

"Comrades!', a piercing voice which almost deafened, stunned and involuntarily forced you to listen and be silent.

"The words flowed like fiery lava, the voice thundered, sometimes broke, a glass fell from his frenzied movements, he banged the table with his fist and threatened anyone who disobeyed.

"The Red Armymen assumed a dignified air as he promised them much happy, bloody work.

"A face impudent, disdainful, distorted by some convulsion.

"He spoke only about one thing—blood, blood, and more blood. He boasted shamelessly of his atrocities. He jeered at the corpses of the tortured. He was intoxicated by voluptuousness and this intoxication was taken up by the crowd. It was all so simple: kill more, plunder more and everything would be ours.

"...If there must be 300 million heads, then we, without flinching, will cut off these millions...."

"He was loathsome, he was intolerably vile, this satan in a tasteless shopkeeper's red kerchief and he could not arouse any feeling even among these slaves of his who were blinded, flushed with hunger and a thirst for plunder, violence and murder but they would follow him as he was able to arouse in them the blackest and the basest.

"While differing opinions are still possible about Lenin, about Trotsky even the most avid communists speak of him only with shame and disrespect.

"His personality causes no doubts. He is the purest villain and does not even trouble himself to assume a noble stance.

"His overseas adventures are a solid chain of criminal major and minor infamies.

"A comrade's court condemned him for the theft of a watch, he has been accused of corruption, his political intrigues were of the basest, dirtiest sort and he was rather close to German spies even before the war.

"But he has been able to brazenly raise his head and cynically make fun of the dull bourgeois moralists.

"He is a superman, a supercrook and a supercriminal.

"It is an intolerable blasphemy that he mixes in with his deeds words about the people's good and the love for others, although in a specific, Bolshevik meaning of these sacred words.

"Incidentally, he rarely says these official words and the spirit of his speeches is one of hate and blood. Pettily vengeful and a cowardly merciless professional butcher (not a murderer but only the executioner of the unprotected), he knows how to threaten and allure crimes. Those who are seduced by the black flowers of evil are afraid of him and follow him.

"But in addition to this terrible side, there is in Trotsky-Bronshiteyn something ineffable and ridiculous.

"An unbecoming elegance, an exaggerated charm for a demonic personality and breaker of women's hearts, impudent familiarity of the upstart, and overconfident self-esteem—all of this makes him like a traveling salesman who plays the part of a social lion or even worse an 'interesting man' with a dark past, present and, of course, future.

"While in some of his colleagues I can still see a certain feeling of measure and decency, these delicate feelings are unknown to Trotsky.

"He dumps himself into an armchair (in the literal and figurative sense), he is ready to put his feet up on the table, and in all his gestures and facial expressions you feel only one thing an intolerable, caricature-like vulgarity of a conceited insolent fellow.

"All these parades and reviews of Trotsky, all the splendor of his appearances surrounded by a brilliant suite of Red generals and officers—all of this is a coarse, tasteless farce, a farce which, unfortunately, you cannot make fun of as it is too repulsive.

"Lev Trotsky-Bronshiteyn can be proud that he, an international crook, has conquered...all of Russia, he orders the execution of the old fighting generals who shed blood for the glory of great Russia, he lives in the Kremlin Palace and commands the Russian Army.

"Anyone who has seen him even for an instant will probably never forget this and will long be unable to free himself from the stifling nausea which happens when you accidentally touch a toad or some other unbearably vile animal."

The assertion that L.D. Trotsky was the leader and organizer of the Red Army, as was noted in the 41st Paragraph of the Political Regulations of the Red Army and Navy distributed for discussion in 1922, is absolutely incorrect. Without going into a critique of the compilers of this document, it must be pointed out that this was not a Marxist approach in evaluating the personality of Trotsky who was always against the application of Marxism to military affairs. At a meeting of the military delegates of the 11th RKP(b) Congress on 1 April 1922, Trotsky himself said about Marxism: "Are our regulations actually created by Marxist methods? This is the first time I have heard of this. The regulations sum up military experience. But how can they be reconciled by a Marxist method? This is a method of historical, social science...there is no military 'science' and there has never been...."³²

S.I. Gusev in his "Nashi raznoglasiya v voyennom dele" [Our Differences in Military Affairs] points out that Trotsky in his speeches and works rarely referred to Marxism but "it is merely to be regretted that Comrade Trotsky spoke in a Marxist manner very rarely and randomly and in a predominant majority of instances, restricted himself to repeating Marxist and Bolshevik

phrases without going into their actual sense and without considering all the conclusions stemming from these phrases.

"Comrade Trotsky adapted these phrases to Trotskyism. That is why he has produced a 'Trotskyized' Marxism and Leninism."³³

Footnotes

1. The Leftist Socialist Revolutionaries in theory shared the Bolshevik program of the dictatorship of the working class. During that period they held ministerial posts in the Soviet government.... Several times they left the government and then returned. On 6-7 July 1918, in Moscow they initiated a Leftist SR revolt (the counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the Leftist SRs).

2. The First Machine Gun Courses which from January 1919 were moved to the Kremlin and billeted in the Kremlin Barracks which are now on the site of the present Palace of Congresses were given the task of training new officer personnel from the workers and peasants for the young Red Army. Their students (cadets) were used for standing guard duty in the Kremlin.

3. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 33987, inv. 2, file 141, sheet 183.

4. V.I. Lenin, "Voyennaya perepiska. 1917-1922 gg." [Military Correspondence. 1917-1922], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, 438 pages.

5. Ibid.

6. M.M. Lashevich (1884-1928). Member of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] from 1901. A Bolshevik. Participated in the preparations and carrying out of the October Armed Insurrection. Commander of the Siberian Military District and chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee and deputy people's commissar of military and naval affairs and member of the USSR RVS.

7. TsGASA, folio 6, inv. 12, file 38, sheets 29, 29 verso, 30.

8. L.P. Serebryakov (1888-1937) joined the party in 1905. From July 1919, he was a member of the Southern Front RVS.—A.P.

9. "Trotskizm—vrag leninizma" [Trotskyism—The Enemy of Leninism], Moscow, Izd-vo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1968, p 121.

10. [Not in text]

11. Sergey Ivanovich Gusev (Yakov Davidovich Drabkin, 1887-1933) was a Soviet party, state and military leader. Member of the CPSU from 1896. An active participant in the October Armed Insurrection in Petrograd. During the years of the Civil War (from 1918 through 1920), he was a member of the RVS of the 5th and 2d Armies, a member of the RVS of the Eastern,

Southeastern, Southern and Caucasus Fronts, the commander of the Moscow Defense Sector, a commissar of the Field Staff of the RVSR. From 1921, he was the chief of the RKKA Political Directorate. In holding the designated posts, he took a direct part in directing fighting on the fronts of the Civil War.

In 1924, he headed a commission of the RKP(b) Central Committee for investigating the state of the Red Army.

12. I.T. Smilga (1892-1938) joined the party in 1907. In 1920-1921, he was a member of the RVSR and member of the RVS of the Western, Southern, Caucasus and Southeastern Fronts. From 1921 through 1923, he was the deputy chairman of the VSNKh [All-Russian Council of the National Economy] and chief of the Main Fuel Directorate.

13. V.I. Lenin, "Voyennaya perepiska....," p 196.

14. I.V. Stalin reported to V.I. Lenin on the situation on the front, his opinion about Voroshilov and Minin and at the same time requested permission to remain on the Southern Front, in agreeing to work with Comrades Sytin and Mekhonoshin.

15. V.I. Lenin, op. cit., pp 8-99.

16. M. Sayers, A. Kan, "Taynaya vojna protiv Sovetskoy Rossii" [The Secret War Against Soviet Russia], translated from the English, Moscow, Gosizdat Inostrannoy Literatury, 1947, p 210.

17. The armies of the Eastern Front, having been pushed by Kolchak back to a line of the Volga and Vyatka Rivers, after the reordering of the battle formations and taking advantage of the muddy season, on 28 April 19, commenced a counteroffensive. In fearing the envelopment of his left (southern) flank and the coming out of our troops in his rear, Kolchak constantly rolled back the entire front from Orenburg to Perm. The operation was successfully carried out. But 7 days later after its start, suddenly without a request from the Eastern Front RVS, this order was drawn up.

18. The ignorance of the situation on the part of the new commander of the front as well as the abrupt change in the methods of troop command (the issuing of erroneous and even incorrect orders and the issuing of tasks to the divisions over the head of the army commanders) caused confusion in the staffs. The front began to falter. A month later S.S. Kamenev again (upon the decision of the RKP(b) Central Committee) assumed command of the Eastern Front.

19. S.I. Gusev, "Nashi raznoglasiya v voyennom dele" [Our Differences in Military Affairs], Moscow, Izd. Tsentralnoy Voennoy Gazety Krasnaya Zvezda, 1925, pp 62-63.

20. Ibid., pp 67-68.

21. Ibid., pp 70-71.

22. Ibid.
23. TsGAGA, folio 33987, inv. 2, file 3, sheet 49.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., sheet 76.
26. Ibid., inv. 1, file 329, sheets 51-52.
27. Ibid., sheets 67-68.
28. Ibid., file 359, sheets 376-377.
29. Ibid., folio 33987, inv. 2, file 89, sheet 18.

30. Sergey Abramovich Auslender (1888-1943), a Russian Soviet writer, theatrical figure. Completed gymnasium. Prior to the revolution he wrote fiction and drama. After the revolution he was a children's writer. In the TsGASA (folio 33987, inv. 2, file 141, sheet 664) there is a document of 21 November 1922, No 81945 with the following content: "Secretariat of the Collegium. To Comrade Trotsky. You have inquired whether we know if citizen Auslender, a former Kolchak follower, is in Russia and in hiding?"

"We know that citizen Auslender who, during the time of the Kolchak dictatorship in Siberia worked as a journalist, upon the elimination of Kolchak, went underground in Soviet Russia under the name of S.M. Grishin, in being employed in pedagogical activities. In October of this year, citizen Auslender with our knowledge and approval was legalized. Deputy Chairman of the GPU [State Political Directorate] (Unshlikht)." Auslender himself in an autobiography wrote: "...In 1920, I happened to fall into work with children...and for 2 years I worked as an ordinary teacher in nurseries...in 1922, I returned to Moscow to literature..." (V.L. Lidin, "Pisateli" [Writers], Moscow, Sovremennyye Problemy, 1928, p 30).

31. The prominent American correspondent Isaac F. Marcuson thus described a speech of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs Trotsky at one of the mass meetings in Moscow: "The appearance of Trotsky was what actors call a brilliant entrance. After a pause and at the appropriate psychological moment, he (Trotsky) appeared from out of the wings and walked quickly to a small rostrum which is put up for speakers at all meetings in Moscow.

"Even before his appearance a rustle of anticipation ran through the vast audience. From mouth to mouth the words were passed on: 'Trotsky is coming.' He was elemental, almost coarse in his passion, a high-voltage human dynamo. He unleashed against the audience a Niagra of words the likes of which I have never heard before. In them resounded primarily vain glory and boldness" (M. Sayers, A. Kan, op. cit., p 207).

32. S.I. Gusev, "Nashi raznoglasiya....," pp 5-6.
33. Ibid., pp 25-26.

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